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ABSTRACT 
 
The Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs), established in terms of the 
Skills Development Act, 97 of 1998, are seen to play a key role in delivering skills 
development central  to addressing the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality. The SETAs performance has been criticised with concerns being raised 
about their capacity, governance crises and corruption.  One of the key challenges 
impeding the success of the skills development system lies in its institutional 
arrangements.  The organisational structure and reporting requirements appear to be 
highly complex with SETAs reporting to various line ministries, such as the Department 
of Higher Education and Training (DHET), and National Treasury.  The governance 
system comprises of multi-layered stakeholders.  
 
The purpose of the research is to explore and understand the nature of governance 
within the Manufacturing Engineering and Related Services SETA (merSETA), one of 
the 21 Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs). The research followed a 
case study design that used a qualitative approach. Thirteen semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with members of the various stakeholder fora, such as the Accounting 
Authority, and sub-committees governing the merSETA. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed.  Findings of the research based on the perceptions of the respondents 
and corroborated with the review and analysis of internal documents included: 
governance challenges as a result of the prescriptive targets and expenditure directives 
from the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) and National Treasury 
respectively; the need for more senior players within the merSETA; the issue of ’mission 
creep’; institutional challenges  (such as decision making and challenges pertaining to 
planning and reporting) and performance and monitoring and evaluation. The 
recommendations of the research include a review of the composition of the Accounting 
Authority and sub-committees of the merSETA, a review of the scale and scope of the 
mandate, holistic capacity building of stakeholders and the organisation, and that the 
Minister of the DHET pronounces on the long term vision of the SETA landscape in 
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respect of the number of SETAs that will be retained as well as a review of the current 5 
year (re)establishment of the SETAs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Historical context 
 
The idea for a state driven National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) was given 
expression in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Ministry during 
the “heady days” after the first democratic elections in April 1994 (Swilling & van Breda, 
2007, p. 126).  The emergence of the legislative framework that underpins this strategy 
is geared towards ensuring skills training does indeed take place (Lundall, 2003). 
 
Prior to 1994 the labour market policies of the Apartheid regime, which shaped racially 
based inequality and exploitation, were used to keep the wages of the majority of South 
Africa’s citizens low (Bird &Heitmann, 2009).  The democratic state had to contend with 
numerous infrastructural backlogs including housing and service delivery, and education 
and training. The legacy of apartheid still reverberates in areas such as education and 
training, as is evidenced by statistics depicting that approximately 64% of the white 
population had obtained degrees, diplomas and certificates as opposed to 36% of the 
black majority having attained a similar educational status a decade after the dawn of 
democracy (Bird & Heitmann, 2009).    
 
Daniels (2007) opines that the structural nature of the economy which consisted 
primarily of the mining, agriculture and the services sector, were substantially 
transformed, forcing firms to become more competitive and export oriented.  Global 
competitive pressures coupled with the levelling of the social wage (Bird & Heitmann, 
2009) resulted in an increase in capital-intensive technological changes and business 
re-engineering, with its resultant skills implications (Daniels, 2007).    
 
Unemployment remains the reality for 25.6% who are actively seeking employment and 
a further 36.8% (Berkowitz, 2013) of discouraged workers who have given up the 
search.  Vally and Motala (2014) argue that the high level of unemployment in South 
Africa is a reality of the structural constraints of the economy.  Forslund (as cited in 
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Vally & Motala, 2014 p. 5) argues that “unless capital flight is prevented, wages are 
increased and inequality is addressed, the high levels of unemployment in the country 
will not be ameliorated”.  The state is seen as being the principle service provider and 
remains the largest employer in the country (Bird & Heitmann, 2009). 
 
The South African government through the Department of Labour (DoL) promulgated 
various pieces of legislation from 1998 and set up the Sector Education Training 
Authorities (SETAs) which replaced the industry training boards.  The SETAs have been 
restructured a number of times since inception from an initial twenty five SETAs under 
the Department of Labour (DoL) to the current twenty one SETAs under the Department 
of Higher Education and Training (DHET) (DHET, 2011). The SETAs’ core mandate is 
to drive new interventions in skills development (Lundall, 2003).  However, the SETAs 
performance has been criticised with concerns being raised about their capacity, 
governance crises and corruption.  
 
The author has selected the (SETAs) and more specifically the Manufacturing, 
Engineering and Related Services SETA (merSETA) as a policy case study. The 
merSETA, which covers five sectors, i.e. Metal and engineering, Auto manufacturing, 
Motor retail and component manufacturing, Tyre manufacturing and the Plastics 
industry, is one of the 21 SETA’s.  The manufacturing sector is considered as one of the 
key drivers for economic growth.  The study will explore and understand the nature of 
governance and the institutional arrangements in the merSETA, based on the 
perceptions of the respondents and corroborated with the review and analysis of 
internal documents. 
1.2 Background of the SETAs 
 
The Skills development architecture was facilitated by at least four key policy 
documents namely: the Skills Development Act 97 of 1998, (SDA) the Skills 
Development Levies Act no. 9 of 1999 (SDLA), the National Skills Development 
Strategy (2001), and the Human Resources Development Strategy (2001) (Daniels, 
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2007).  The aforementioned Acts together form the legislative framework aimed at 
addressing the dire skills shortages in the country.  
 
The National Skills Authority (NSA) was established in terms of the Skills Development 
Act (1998), (SDA) and the Skills Development Levies Act (1999) (SDLA). The NSA is 
responsible for co-ordinating the skills development strategy nationally and advises the 
Minister of Higher Education and Training on all aspects of the implementation of the 
NSDS. The vision of the National Skills Development Strategy III (NSDSIII) is: ”A skilled 
and capable workforce that shares in, and contributes to, the benefits and opportunities 
of economic expansion and an inclusive growth path” (DHET, 2010, p. 5). This vision 
has been challenged by, amongst others, Vally and Motala (2014) who argue that an 
increase in the skills of the workforce will not increase economic growth as the major 
fault-line of the economy is structural.   
 
The implementation of the NSDS is the responsibility of the NSA, Provincial Offices of 
the NSF and the SETAs.  The NSF is managed by the Department of Higher Education 
and Training (DHET) and guided by advice from the National Skills Authority (NSA) 
(DHET, 2011). The NSF was created to provide funding to address issues of national 
importance and redress for previously disadvantaged groups, including the 
unemployed, women, youth, rural people, people with disabilities, as well as small 
businesses (Swilling & van Breda, 2007). 
 
The purposes of the SDA, are amongst others: 
To develop the skills of the South African workforce; 
To increase the levels of investment in education and training in the labour 
market and to improve the return on that investment; 
To encourage employers, to play a more proactive role in skills development 
activities for existing employees, for new entrants to the labour market to gain 
work experience, and to assist people struggling to find employment; 
To encourage workers to participate in learnerships and other training 
programmes; 
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To improve the employment prospects of persons previously disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination and to redress those disadvantages through training 
and education; 
To ensure the quality of education and training in and for the workplace 
(DHET, 2011, p. 5, 6). 
 
The SETAs are stakeholder entities, comprised of representatives from organised 
employers, organised labour, communities and government.  “The SETAs are funded 
through the 1% tax levy, of which 80% goes to the SETA and 20% to the National Skills 
Fund” (DHET, 2011, p. 6).   
     
According to Wedekind (cited in Vally & Motala, 2014), the SETA’s replaced the former 
Industry Training Boards.  Employers are required to submit annual workplace training 
skills plans (WSPs1) and are reimbursed a portion of the training levy.  Employers are 
also responsible for quality assuring training providers and coordinating the standards 
generating bodies who are tasked with developing unit standards and qualifications.  
The learnership system which was meant to replace the apprenticeship system was 
also introduced through the SDA (Vally & Motala, 2014). 
 
The SETAs report to the Minister of the DHET who is the Executive Authority.  The 
SETAs also report to the National Treasury, in terms of the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA), and to the respective SETA’s Accounting Authority.  The SETAs are 
governed by the standard SETA constitution.   
 
The merSETA is a schedule 3a public entity.  The Minister of Higher Education and 
Training (HET) is the main stakeholder on behalf of Government.  The Governing Board 
is defined as the Accounting Authority in terms of the PFMA of 1999 (as amended) and 
Treasury Regulations.  The merSETA is stakeholder driven and in terms of the SDA, it 
                                                 
1
 The purpose and definitions of the WSP and mandatory and discretionary grants are attached hereto as 
appendix A. 
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must be equally represented by organised labour and organised employers (merSETA, 
Corporate Governance)2. 
 
The merSETA Constitution was approved by the Minister of HET on 1 April 2011 in 
terms of section 13 (1) of the SDA.  The Minister announced in November 2011 that the 
merSETA had been re-established and certified from 1 April 2011 to 31 March 2016. 
 
The following diagram is a schematic representation of the structure of the merSETA. 
 
Figure 1: The schematic representation of the merSETA  
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2 This section draws chiefly on the description of the  merSETAs corporate governance and organisational 
structure found at: http://www.merseta.org.za/AboutUs/CorporateGovernance.aspx 
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1.3 Composition and responsibilities of the merSETA structures  
In line with the merSETA constitution, the Accounting Authority comprises of 15 
members in a non-executive and independent non-executive capacity.  Accounting 
Authority members are appointed by the Minister of HET in terms of the merSETA 
Constitution.  Twelve of the members are nominated and represent organised labour 
and organised employers from the Sector.  Three additional members who are 
independent are directly appointed by the Minister (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
 
The terms of office of members of the Accounting Authority is five years.  They are 
eligible for re-appointment upon expiry of the term of office, provided that the 
reappointed members do not exceed one third of the members of the Accounting 
Authority at any one term (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
 
The Executive Committee is responsible for overseeing the management of the 
operational affairs of the merSETA.  It also manages, coordinates and monitors the 
activities of Chamber Committees (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
 
The Audit and Risk Committee performs the functions as contemplated in the PFMA.  It 
is responsible for, amongst other functions, ensuring the adequacy and effectiveness of 
the risk management process, internal control systems, the internal audit function and 
reviewing the annual financial statements to ensure that these have been prepared in 
accordance with the PFMA and related Treasury Regulations, as well as the applicable 
accounting framework (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
 
The Remuneration Committee is responsible for the development of guidelines and 
reviews the compensation and performance of staff of the organisation.  It reviews and 
approves corporate goals relevant to the compensation of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) and evaluates the CEO’s performance in respect of these goals and objectives.  
It is also responsible for all human resources related matters (merSETA, Corporate 
Governance). 
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The Education, Training, Quality Assurance (ETAQ) Committee is responsible for the 
oversight of the execution of the quality assurance functions and obligations of the 
merSETA on behalf of the Accounting Authority (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
 
The Finance and Grants Committee is responsible for the oversight role in respect of 
the management of grant disbursement by the merSETA (merSETA, Corporate 
Governance). 
 
The Chamber Committee develops sub-sectoral inputs into the Sector Skills Plan 
(SSP3), identifying education and training needs.  It also makes inputs to education and 
training policies and monitors the development and implementation of learning 
programmes as well as other training in the sub-sector (merSETA, Corporate 
Governance). 
 
The Regional Committees form a strategic link with regard to the flow of information 
between chambers and merSETA regional committee structures in line with the 
country’s nine provinces (merSETA, Corporate Governance). 
1.4 Governance within the merSETA  
The merSETA reports to the Executive Authority – the DHET – 
who, in terms of the Act is accountable to Parliament for skills development.  The 
Executive Authority must exercise its powers and responsibilities in order to 
ensure that the implementation of the objectives and execution of the functions of 
the SETA comply with both the Act and the policies of the Executive Authority, 
and,  
(2) In executing its accountability and responsibility functions the Executive 
Authority must exercise its powers in terms of the Act, the PFMA, the standard 
SETA constitution and any other relevant legislation (DHET, 2012, p. 9).   
                                                 
3 “SETAs are responsible for developing a sector skills plan within the framework of the national skills 
development strategy.  The minimalist scope related to the responsibility is to signal broad trends 
emerging from a national analysis of broad economic trends.  The wide scope related to the responsibility 
is detailed forecasting that allows for a modelling exercise which translates knowledge of skills needs and 
a functioning training system” (Marock et al., 2008, pg. 8). 
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The Governing Board4 of the merSETA, is the Accounting Authority of the SETA, 
and   
shall assume ultimate accountability and responsibility for the performance and 
affairs of merSETA and shall in so doing effectively represent and promote the 
interests of the stakeholders.  Board members, both independent non-executives 
and-executives and non-executives, carry full fiduciary responsibility and owe a 
duty of care and skill to merSETA in terms of Common Law and Code of Ethics.  
The Board is the focal point of corporate governance in merSETA.  It is ultimately 
accountable and responsible for the performance and affairs of merSETA 
(merSETA Board Charter, 2011a, p. 4, 5, 13).  
 
The merSETA subscribes to the Batho Pele (People First) principles (Annual Report, 
2010:2013). 
 
The Governing Board delegates the day to day management of the merSETA to the 
executive management under the leadership of the CEO (merSETA Board Charter, 
2011a). 
 
The merSETA has established a governance unit which is responsible for all the 
governance functions of the merSETA.  These responsibilities include ensuring that the 
merSETA complies with the King Code III as well as complies with the PFMA and other 
related statutes.  The unit ensures that an annual year plan comprising of all scheduled 
meetings of all the structures are planned and distributed to all stakeholders at least a 
year in advance.  The unit also acts as the secretariat of the merSETA ensuring that 
agendas and relevant documentation is distributed to stakeholders at least seven days 
before the scheduled meeting dates.  Minutes are prepared and distributed to 
stakeholders within 14 days after the occurrence of meetings.  In addition the unit 
develops a decision list for all meetings in order to track and ensure that outstanding 
                                                 
4 Various respondents have used Governing Board and Accounting Authority interchangeably.  The 
author uses the term Accounting Authority as encapsulated in the merSETA 2012/2013 Annual Report, p. 
45. 
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agenda items are addressed by the relevant structures.  The unit also arranges regular 
capacity building interventions for stakeholders, such as the Accounting Authority.   
 
The SETAs are considered central in mediating the relationship between training (the 
supply side) and socio-economic requirements (the demand side) (Marock, Harrison-
Train, Soobrayan, Gunthorpe, 2008).  
 
Social compacts between the private sector, organised labour, communities and 
government are key in creating a platform for creating five million new jobs by 2020 
(NGP, 2011). The NSDSIII is the overarching strategic guide for skills development and 
serves as a guideline for sector skills planning and implementation in the SETAs. It is 
geared towards increasing the skills and qualifications base which is required to support 
priorities and initiatives such as the New Growth Path (NGP), the Industrial Policy 
Action Plan (IPAP), the Human Resources Development Strategy (HRDS), and more 
importantly, sector development plans, which is central to this policy, and is now in its 
third five year term (DHET, 2010). 
 
Prior to May 2009, Skills Development policy fell under the auspices of the DoL and was 
underpinned by the National Skills Development Strategy and the Quality Council for 
Trades and Occupations (QCTO) (Bird & Heitmann, 2009). 
 
Bird and Heitmann (2009, p. 8) proffer that there was disarticulation in the strategy in 
that the strategy lacked a “coordinated, integrated and responsive system”.  This was 
illustrated through parallels evident between the Department of Labour (DoL) and the 
Department of Education (DoE) in their respective policy responses to the Human 
Resources Development strategy. 
 
Bird and Heitmann (2009, p. 10) further argue that the “cleavage between the two 
departments apparently reflects the past failures of the South African government to 
learn lessons from those who, whilst facing similar tensions between demand and 
supply, had evolved systems and strategies to straddle these two domains”. The Zuma 
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administration addressed these issues through splitting the education ministry into two 
departments:  the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) who was 
responsible for overseeing higher education and vocational training and the Department 
of Basic Education devoted to primary and secondary schooling.  The ANC’s Collins 
Chabane informed the press that “the SETAs would be moved from the Department of 
Labour to the Department of Education, as the country needed to have one coordinated 
training ministry in the country that will focus on the provisions of skills” (Bird & 
Heitmann, 2009, p. 11).  Following this announcement a Minister for Higher Education 
and Training was appointed to the Zuma cabinet and the Skills Development 
programme of the DoL was informed of its wholesale transfer to the new department 
(Bird & Heitmann, 2009). 
 
This newly established Department of Higher Education and Training, which was 
established in May 2009 inherited functions and responsibilities from both the DoL and 
the former DoE.  It is responsible for, amongst others, ensuring the achievements of the 
targets set out in NSDSIII.  The DHET is also responsible for a performance monitoring 
and evaluation system to ensure regular monitoring and evaluation (including impact 
assessments) of programmes and projects.  The performance monitoring and 
evaluation system is integral to the SETAs discharging its mandate in the most effective 
and efficient manner (DHET, 2011).  
 
NSDS III argues that the real value added by SETAs is their understanding of labour 
market issues in their respective industrial and economic sectors.  In order to be able to 
speak with authority on skills development, SETAs must begin to demonstrate their 
commitment to addressing the skills needs within their sectors, through innovative 
cutting-edge interventions (DHET, 2011).  One of these interventions is the learnership 
and apprenticeship system, whose primary objective is the retraining and up-skilling of 
the existing workforce, culminating in a broader base of incumbents with higher level 
skills (Lundall, 2003). 
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1.5 Problem Statement 
It has been noted that one of the key challenges impeding the success of the skills 
development system lies in its institutional arrangements.  The organisational structure 
and reporting requirements appear to be highly complex, with SETAs reporting to 
various line ministries such as the DHET, and National Treasury.  The governance 
system comprising of multi-layered stakeholders, potentially creates the space for 
financial mismanagement, and requires substantial resources to maintain (DHET, 
2013).  
 
The Ministerial Task Team (MTT) on SETA performance has noted that it appears as 
though the SETAs mandate is too broad with an opinion being articulated that the 
SETAs are expected to respond to various societal challenges, including illiteracy, 
unemployment, out-of-school youth, and university funding (DHET, 2013). 
 
SETAs are evaluated annually against the criteria contained in the NSDSIII which is 
conducted jointly by representatives of the DHET and the respective SETA (DHET, 
2013).  Marock et al. (2008) have highlighted the challenges of this evaluation and 
reporting framework noting the inherent problems of self-reporting and their lack of 
success in attempting to triangulate data received from the SETAs. 
 
To compound the above, the SETA’s have received on-going negative criticism in the 
public domain since their inception.  In particular the SETA’s have been criticised for 
their lack of governance, maladministration, and inefficient usage of public resources 
(Redelinghuys, 2013).  In addition, academic analyses and press reports have raised 
concerns about the effectiveness of the learnerships training programmes being offered.  
These analyses have included reviews of the performance scorecards of the SETAs 
highlighting that enrolments are high, but throughput levels are extremely low.  The 
SETAs appear to have been plagued by capacity problems, corruption and governance 
crises. These factors amongst others, do not bode well for the SETA’s in their quest to 
discharge their mandate (Swilling & van Breda, 2007). Given the huge amount of 
resources allocated to the SETA system (levies increased from R4 426 003 billion in 
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2007 to R 8 609 811 520 billion in 2011) it is prudent that additional knowledge 
regarding the effectiveness of the system is gained (DHET, 2011). 
1.6 Motivation for the research 
 
The (MTT) report to the Minister of DHET on the performance of SETAs, has found 
amongst others, that confusion exists between the Boards in relation to their execution 
of their fiduciary duties, more particularly the critical importance of stakeholder 
participation in the strategic activities of the SETAs.  This has resulted in poor corporate 
governance within the SETAs as well as inadequate strategic focus on demand-led 
skills development (DHET, 2013).  Furthermore, there appears to be evidence of 
systemic governance challenges including weak financial accountability and oversight 
within some SETAs, as well as a lack of documentation for NSF income and 
expenditure (DHET, 2013).  This lends credence to repeated claims of fruitless and 
wasteful expenditure of much needed limited resources.  
 
In highlighting the numerous compliance and governance challenges affecting the 
SETAs, the MTT report argues that this is primarily as a result of the SETAs institutional 
arrangements (DHET, 2013).   
 
The institutional design of the SETAs consists of multi-layered stakeholders 
participating within fora such as the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC), the NSA as well as SETA boards.  These structures comprise of 
representatives from Government, Business, Social partners, the SETA sub-
committees, (Audit, Remuneration, Finance and Executive Committee), as well as 
related accounting mechanisms such as the Parliamentary portfolio committee, DHET 
and the Minister of the DHET.  Often times, the same individuals are represented on 
these different structures, resulting in ambiguity in terms of oversight roles, 
accountability and responsibility.  For example, members represented on the 
Accounting Authority of the merSETA are also represented on the sub-structures, 
including the Executive Committee, the Chamber Committees, the Audit and Risk 
Committee, and the Finance and Grants Committee.  It is instructive to note the roles of 
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these committees which are presented on pages 16 to 17 above. These roles and 
responsibilities vary from providing oversight and accountability, to managing the 
operational affairs of the merSETA to the development of the sub-sectoral inputs into 
the merSETA SSP. The SSP is the consolidation of the 5 sub sectors skills needs 
including scare and critical skills lists identified by the five chambers.  Members of the 
SETA boards are also jointly accountable, which is not aligned with the PFMA 
requirements where an individual is the accounting authority (DHET, 2013). In addition, 
the outputs of the system, such as learnerships and apprenticeships have to be linked 
to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), requiring co-ordination between the 
various training providers, SETAs and the Department of Education.  Often citied 
occurrences of long delays in the accreditation system has caused frustration as well as 
thwarted the provision of training.  This has been identified as a key institutional 
impediment in the effectiveness of the skills development system (Daniels, 2007). 
 
As can be gleaned from the aforementioned, the SETA’s are faced with numerous 
challenges, which include amongst others: governance; the policy/political environment; 
institutional and capacity constraints; accountability and transparency as well as 
delivery.   
 
Given the complexity of these issues both individually and within the context illustrated 
above, the author has researched these issues through the lens of governance. The 
UNDP defines governance as managing a country’s affairs at all levels through 
exercising administrative, economic and political authority.  This entails utilising decision 
making processes aligned with democratic practices whereby citizens … “articulate their 
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences”  
(Grindle, 2007, p. 556).  The study focused on the perceptions of the stakeholders of 
the weaknesses in governance in the merSETA. The study also entailed an examination 
of how the stakeholders viewed the institutional mechanisms such as the stakeholders’ 
decision making processes, their adherence to policy and procedures, their 
accountability and responsibility, as well as oversight and transparency.   
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1.7 Research Objectives 
1.7.1 Research aim and objectives 
The purpose of this research is to explore and understand the nature of governance and 
the institutional arrangements in the merSETA.  The research examines the governance 
and institutional arrangements based on the stakeholders' perceptions of the delivery of 
the learnership and apprenticeship system. 
 
The merSETA was used as a case study geared towards understanding the nature of 
its governance and institutional arrangements within the merSETA.  
 
The institutional structure that was examined included the Accounting Authority which 
develops policy in terms of the code of conduct and the Executive Committee (Exco) 
with specific regard to the allocation of resources.  It also examined the stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the management of the administrative processes, policies and 
procedures, as well as the “human resources deployed to interface with citizens in the 
political and bureaucratic space” (Grindle, 2007, p. 553).     
 
The study highlighted what the perceptions of the stakeholders are regarding the 
challenges that impacts on the delivery of the learnerships and apprenticeship system, 
a key cornerstone of the SETA mandate (DHET, 2011).  
1.7.2 Primary Research Question  
What are the governance and institutional arrangements that currently exist in the 
merSETA and how do stakeholders view their effectiveness?  
1.8 Research Design 
Qualitative analysis was used for this study as it provided the author with opportunities 
to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources (Baxter 
& Jack, 2008).  As a strategy, qualitative research usually emphasises words rather 
than quantification in the analysis of data, and it is inductivist, constructionist, and 
interpretive.  It allowed the author to interact with one single distinct group being the 
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merSETA stakeholders as well as provided an opportunity to interact with the 
respondents listed in Appendix B.  This provided the author with an opportunity to gain 
valuable insight into the organisation as well as to gather data from a variety of sources 
and to converge the data to illuminate the case.  The corroboration of the theory in 
respect of governance and institutional arrangements emerged out of the collection and 
analysis of the data (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
1.9 Scope, Limitations and Assumptions 
This section of the research report clarifies the scope of the research as well as 
identifies some of the limitations of the study.  This section also identifies some of the 
assumptions that underpin the research. 
 
The research is limited to the merSETA as a case study for investigation and analysis.  
One of the limitations of a case study is that it is not generalisable. 
 
A further limitation of the research is that it is a single case study and the purpose is 
simultaneously both descriptive and exploratory.  The author was employed in the 
capacity of Skills Planning Manager at the merSETA for the period March 2005 to 
November 2007, and is aware that subjectivity is always present in research, and of the 
impact this may have on the research project. 
1.10 Structure of the Report 
Chapter One comprises of the background and context as well as summaries of the 
subsequent chapters.  The background covers the evolution of the Skills Development 
Architecture, situated within a brief overview of the socio economic conditions prevailing 
post 1994.  Chapter Two comprises of the literature which reviews concepts of 
governance in amongst others, Grindle (2007), Leftwich (1994), DHET (2011), Peters 
(2011), as well as the concept of institutions in Leftwich (2007) and Pierre (2009), and 
decision making, non-decision making in Ham and Hill (1993).  SETA reviews 
conducted by amongst others, Bird and Heitmann (2009), DHET (2011), (Marock et al. 
(2008), and Lundall (2003) have also been reviewed.  Chapter Three examines the 
research design which includes limitations of the study.  The study did not review the 
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performance monitoring and evaluation system neither the quality assurance system in 
any detail, but relied primarily on the perceptions of the stakeholders of the 
effectiveness of the performance monitoring and evaluation system.  It sketches the 
scale and scope of the NSDSIII, and the rationale for only selecting learnerships and 
apprenticeships to understand and explore the stakeholder’s perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the merSETA. The rationale for using a case study and a qualitative 
approach as well as the methodology employed is discussed in this section.  Chapter 
Four presents the findings of the study.  Chapter Five discusses the findings of the data 
collected.  Some of the findings include an analysis of the governance structure and the 
institutional arrangements of the merSETA.  In particular, the findings highlight the 
decision making processes within the merSETA.  Chapter Six encapsulates a synthesis 
of the findings leading to the formulation of recommendations.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW   
 
A survey of various external reviews on SETAs was conducted for this research.  This 
included reviewing secondary data such as reports, articles and minutes related to the 
performance of SETAs in general and the merSETA, in particular. This literature formed 
the basis for the examination of the concept of governance, as well as the institutional 
arrangements within the merSETA. Literature debating the nature of good governance 
and the issues raised was also summarised. 
2.1 Notions of governance  
The UNDP’s definition of governance is used to frame the concept of governance, 
which is defined as: 
the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels.  It comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (p.12) 
(Grindle, 2007, p. 556). 
 
The UNDP further defines good governance as being: 
Characterized as participatory, transparent … accountable …. effective and 
equitable … promotes the rule of law … ensures that political, social and 
economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices 
of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the 
allocation of development resources (p.12);  (Grindle, 2007, p. 556). 
 
Institutional arrangements comprising of mechanisms such as the organisation and its 
structures, the stakeholders, the capacity of stakeholders, roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders, principals, conflicts of interests, decision making, and the fundamentals of 
democracy (including accountability, transparency and participation) are the broad 
categories which are used to explore and understand the nature of governance within 
the merSETA.  Additional mechanisms such as adherence to policy and procedures and 
communication and information are further categories which are used to explore and 
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understand the nature of governance within the merSETA. Leftwich (2005) refers to the 
aforementioned categories as the processes which regulate decision making of various 
economic and societal actors in the public realm.  
 
In defining institutions, Leftwich (2005) posits that the fundamental starting point is to 
recognise that all human societies have been characterised by more or less complex 
and overlapping networks of regular social interactions and social practices. He 
recognises that as humans are a social species who have to live together, it becomes 
imperative that they develop a shared and common understanding of the rules which 
govern them.  This entails understanding how the different actors deal and interact with 
each other, the process of collective decision making and how transgressions are dealt 
with.  These rules encompass the meaning of institutions; institutions are therefore 
broadly understood as encompassing procedures and rules, either enacted in law, i.e. 
within constitutions; or understood as being informal rules and practices embedded in 
practices of organisational culture.  He further asserts that these procedures and rules 
express and sustain power relations (Leftwich, 2005).   
 
The review of the literature indicated that prior research carried out by amongst others, 
Marock et al. (2008) did not adequately analyse the concept of governance in relation to 
the institutional arrangements of the SETAs.  In this regard, Marock et al. (2008) state in 
the SETA Review that they had utilised the Auditor General’s opinion on the fiduciary 
responsibility of the SETAs as indicators of governance.  Other factors pertaining to 
governance such as the levels of participation within the SETA structures, the SETA 
constitutions, and the extent to which stakeholders had a shared understanding of 
governance, were not included in their ratings (Marock et al., 2008).   
 
Substantial changes in the global world necessitated changes in corporate governance 
practices that gave rise to the King III Code of Governance for South Africa (King III). 
King III highlights the importance of ethics5 at board, management and staff levels, and 
                                                 
5 the author defines ethics as … doing the right thing even when no one is watching.  
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in particular, the need for an ethical culture.  However, expecting that an ethical code in 
and of itself will engender a culture of ethics is short-sighted (Barclay, 2009).   
 
King III provides guidelines on the characteristics of board members (or directors, in the 
case of companies) under the following criteria:  competence, commitment, fiduciary 
responsibilities and supervision (Singizi, 2007). 
 
The King III report is widely regarded as a guideline for government to enforce 
compliance on government departments, state owned enterprises and public entities 
(Barclay, 2009).  King III, however does not offer guidance on some of the governance 
challenges that not for profits are faced with as in the example of the constituent model 
which is also being promoted by the South African Government. One of the shortfalls of 
this governance model is that it is not aimed at ensuring individuals with diverse 
governance skills are represented on the board.  King III is not mindful of these unique 
challenges and offers no guidance on them (Hendricks & Wyngaard, 2010). 
 
This research does not focus on all the characteristics identified by King Code III above, 
but instead uses the research questions to guide the investigation of the perceptions of 
the stakeholders with regard to institutional arrangements including decision making 
and accountability, the capacity of the stakeholders and their roles and responsibilities 
and conflict of interests within a governance context.   
 
The author draws on Grindle (2004), who suggests that the international development 
community has defined the good governance agenda as encompassing a growing list of 
unrealistic criteria without taking cognisance of what needs to be done; when it needs to 
be done; and whether it is feasible or not (Grindle, 2004).   
 
According to Grindle (2004), the literature on the advocacy for good governance is 
“ahistorical”, in that the practice of good governance in most of the developing countries 
took decades and even centuries to achieve.  Despite the pressure that is being exerted 
on developing counties to create similar conditions it is critical to take cognisance of the 
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immaturity of democracy within some of these countries. Attaining good governance 
includes having to decentralise government in order to increase the effective and 
efficient management of resources.  It deepens the culture of accountability and 
responsiveness to the majority of poor and working people and assists in reducing 
corruption (Grindle, 2004, p. 531-533).    
 
Grindle (2004, p. 525) opines further that achieving good governance entails a holistic 
improvement within the public sector.  This includes reforms of the “institutions that set 
the rules of the game for economic and political interaction”. It requires that these 
reformed institutions ensure that transparency exists within decision making structures 
tasked with determining and allocating public resources.  It also calls for the deepening 
of the efficacy and effectiveness of the administrative systems underpinning service 
delivery; as well as a human resources system embedded within the principles of the 
primacy of the interests of citizens. Ingram and Smith (1998) caution against equating 
the measurement of the quality of the products consumed with that of an efficient 
administrative system. They state that this efficient administrative system is merely a 
process, and more particularly the “most shallow process” (Ingram & Smith, 1998, p. 7).   
 
Grindle, (2004, p. 525) suggests that the good governance agenda should encompass a 
“more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions as well as government’s 
capabilities”. 
2.2 Stakeholder collaboration  
Stakeholders are defined as all those who are interested in or associated with a 
particular public service, i.e. citizens, interest groups or private businesses (Pierre, 
2009).  
 
The stakeholder driven composition of the SETAs with its varying interests and 
competing expectations poses huge challenges for efficient decision making within the 
SETAs.  These interests range from the primary interests of employer stakeholder 
groups for skills development to increase productivity, to the interests of the trade 
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unions for members to access employment and promotion opportunities as well as 
redress and equity.  It also includes government’s interests of accelerating economic 
growth in order to address the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
Bird and Heitmann (2009) note that during the policy process which led up to NSDSII, 
the negotiations process was followed by very formal negotiations between the 
constituencies, where they were able to bargain effectively on an interest basis, whilst 
simultaneously committing to finding a national consensus.  The jury is still out on 
whether this national consensus translates into sectoral consensus at the individual 
SETA level.   
 
Given that governance entails the behaviour of actors and the rules and processes in 
which power is exercised, particularly with regards to processes such as participation, 
transparency and accountability, it would be prudent for stakeholders to explore more 
collaborative approaches to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and coherence with 
regards to delivering on their mandate (Massey, 2009).  Achieving consensus should 
require that stakeholders do not continue to “play cooperatively each with their own set 
of blocks without pooling their blocks to build a common structure and vision 
collaboratively” (O’Flynn, 2009, p. 112). 
 
This case study took cognisance of the prevailing perceptions of the stakeholders 
regarding the dynamic of collaboration between the different stakeholders; whether 
collaboration had occurred; and whether it had facilitated problem solving and reflection 
on changes to effect policy change (Bird & Heitmann, 2009).  
2.3 Notions of decision making and power 
Peters (2011) refers to the concept of governance as being increasingly complex, both 
in terms of the goals being pursued, i.e. democracy and efficiency, as well as the 
instruments used to pursue those goals. These instruments encompass democratic 
practices such as transparent decision-making and participation. 
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Dahl’s (1958) view in respect of decision making, (cited in Ham & Hill,1993), is that it is 
imperative for researchers to examine actual decision making, particularly within the 
context of the power relations that exist between political actors.  These political actors 
may either be groups and/or individuals.  He emphasised that the question of “power 
must be studied in cases where there are differences of preferences between key 
actors”, and that it was necessary to “analyse concrete decisions involving actors 
pursuing [these] different preferences” (Ham & Hill, 1993, p. 66).   
 
Bachrach and Baratz (cited in Ham & Hill, 1993) argue that understanding power should 
not only entail the examination of decision making processes, but should also examine 
individuals exercising their power through practices which reinforces their social and 
political values and which are not subject to public consideration (Ham & Hill,1993).  
 
The issue of power and consensus in decision making processes is raised by Lukes 
(1974), (cited in Ham & Hill,1993), wherein he posits that the phenomena of individuals 
exercising power with a view to shaping the preferences of people irrespective of 
whether overt or covert conflict is present, does not constitute consensus as latent 
conflict remains present.  Seemingly, individuals who may have desired particular 
preferences may not have been aware of how their interests could have been 
compromised.  
 
Lukes (1974), espouses the view that achieving consensus is not indicative that power 
is not being exercised.  He posits that: 
 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to 
whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, 
cognitions and preferences in such a way that they can see or imagine no 
alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because 
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial?  To assume that the absence of 
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grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false 
or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat (pg. 24) (Ham & Hill.1993, p. 71). 
 
He states further that it is imperative that the phenomena of preventing covert conflict 
from emerging in non-decision making processes should be acknowledged (Ham & Hill, 
1993).  
 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) define non-decision making as: 
  
a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest 
challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker (1970, p. 44)  in other 
words, the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to “safe“ 
issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and political 
institutions and procedures (Ham & Hill,1993, p. 67). 
 
Examples of such non-decision making includes the practice of escalating decision-
making within an organisation, as well as referring decisions for further investigation and 
deliberation to special task teams or committees (Ham & Hill,1993). 
 
The issue of non-decision making occurring according to Bachrach and Baratz (cited in 
Ham & Hill,1993) occurs when various factors, including dynamics of group power 
relations  coupled with the dominant values prevalent at the time, (either singularly or in 
combination) impedes grievances from developing into issues thereby thwarting 
decision making.  They assert that certain forms and practices may impede 
stakeholder’s ability to articulate diffused discontent into explicit demands.  This may 
occur when there is an inarticulate ideology even within progressive institutions with this 
apparently latent [inarticulate] ideology promoting the selective perception and 
articulation of social problems and conflicts (Ham & Hill, 1993).   
 
Walsh et al. (1981) (cited in Ham & Hill,1993) argues that it is imperative that the 
prevalence of power is analysed in situations where the dominant values of individuals 
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serves to disadvantage other individuals and /or groups by virtue of the concurrent 
existence of conflicts as well as the dominance of the elites within organisations.  The 
ideology and attitude of these elites may contribute to a belief that some form of 
consensus exists (Ham & Hill, 1993).  
 
Similarly, Dahl (cited in Ham & Hill, 1993), acknowledged that elites may be in control of 
the dominant views within organisations by virtue of the fact that “leaders do not merely 
respond to the preferences of constituents, they also shape preferences” (Ham & Hill 
1993, p. 74).  
 
Ham and Hills (1993) work highlights that the literature on the “decisional approach, ... 
although valuable” only begins to address the complexities of power relations within 
decision making approaches (Ham & Hill,1993, p. 79).  These processes exhibit 
practices of referral of decisions and co-option of opposition groups and suppression of 
demands and in so doing perpetuating a system of the dominance of powerful groups.  
Structurally, this finds expression through the dominance of males, and symbolically 
through the usage of language within organisations (Ham & Hill, 1993).  
 
The views of the stakeholders regarding institutional arrangements of the merSETA 
more particularly the decision making processes of the stakeholders were examined.  
Leftwich (2007) posits that the formal and informal processes which are based on the 
rules and procedures of institutions influences thought and are deemed to constitute a 
facet of institutions. Leftwich (2007) asserts that change cannot be devoid of resistance 
from competing interests groups.  He further asserts that different interests groups may 
be torn between compliance with the existing formal institutional requirements and the 
demands of informal institutional loyalties in the discharge of their duties (Leftwich, 
2007).  
 
The author observed that the various reports commissioned by the DHET are silent on 
the aforementioned processes which regulates and determines decision-making.  These 
reports did however, analyse the SETAs compliance with various statutes such as King 
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III, the PFMA and National Treasury regulations.  The key principles underpinning these 
statutes are that public institutions should contribute to the effective and efficient 
performance of their specific public mandate through the efficient provision of public 
goods and services, and that they be subject to external scrutiny (Singizi, 2007). 
2.4 Governance structures of the SETAs 
The large governance structures of the SETAs, which are aimed at accommodating all 
constituent stakeholders could contribute to cumbersome management of the SETAs; 
the adoption of bargaining council postures; as well as the different stakeholders 
upholding specific interests rather than sectoral interests, thereby thwarting effective 
and efficient decision-making (Singizi, 2007). 
The Singizi (2007) report notes that the primary motivation for these complex 
institutional arrangements was to create an environment conducive to transformational 
goals such as equity and redress, as well as increasing the impact of training outcomes. 
The complexity of the institutional arrangements however, has had the contrary effect of 
increasing the number of stakeholders and meetings in the decision-making processes.  
This is aptly demonstrated in the fact that the SETAs are accountable to various 
Ministries and organisations most notably the: 
The Minister of Higher Education and Training and the Director-General: DHET 
in respect of their powers and functions under the SDA and the SDLA; 
 
QCTO in respect of their functions as ETQAs under the SAQA Act; and  
 
National Treasury and the Auditor-General in respect of their fiduciary 
responsibility in managing public finances and other public resources in 
compliance with the PFMA (Singizi, 2007, p. 65). 
 
Marock et al. (2008) opine that the complexity of the SETA’s governance structures 
requires a high level of devolution to promote accountability and effectiveness.  The 
SETA governance structures comprises of 15 members in a non-executive and 
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independent non-executive capacity.  Twelve of the members are nominated and 
represent the sector.  Three additional members who are independent are directly 
appointed by the Minister, one of whom is the chairperson.  It has been noted in the 
Ministerial Task Team (MTT) review commissioned by the DHET that “independent 
chairpersons in a constituency based composition model can be a difficult process to 
manage” (DHET, 2013, p. 56-57).  Marock et al. (2008) note further that devolution may 
result in financial mismanagement, requiring various institutional mechanisms such as 
audit policies and procedures, to mediate these risks. 
2.5 Notions of good governance and good performance 
Leftwich (1994), opines that from a narrow administrative perspective, a transparent, 
effective and efficient public service demonstrates good governance.  Good governance 
creates an enabling environment wherein citizens are able to interrogate institutional 
changes as well as capacity building initiatives - which are deemed to be an important 
foundation for development.  Good governance necessitates improvements in all 
spheres of the public sector, particularly the institutions.  This includes the stakeholders, 
as well as the rules and procedures in the decision making processes, culminating in 
the efficient alignment of resources (Grindle, 2007).  Improvements in governance is 
deemed to be a critical element for accessing new revenue streams, improving service 
delivery as well as establishing credibility amongst stakeholders.  
 
The Singizi (2007) report makes a distinction between good governance and good 
performance.  This distinction is evident in the negative criticisms levelled at the SETAs 
performance in the public domain juxtaposed with a review of the annual reports of the 
merSETA for the financial years 2009/2010 to 2012/2013 which indicate that the 
merSETA had met and in most cases exceeded targets across most of the indicators 
(merSETA Annual Report 2012/2013).  The targets and performance information for 
2012/2013 is attached hereto as Appendix C.  
 
Marock et al. (2008) highlights the fact that even though the SETAs may receive high 
rankings in terms of their Sector Skills Plans this does not necessarily indicate that 
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agreement exists within the sector with regard to the scarce and critical skills identified.  
Their report also notes that though it appeared that a thorough process was followed in 
the development of the SSPs, it was not possible to confirm whether in fact 
stakeholders had reached agreement on the priorities outlined.  This pointed to the fact 
that training achievements attained may not necessarily be aligned with industry needs.  
Furthermore, concern was raised that bad data underpinning the planning processes 
seriously impeded effective performance monitoring and evaluation.  This challenge 
was as a result of the lack of effective information management systems (Marock et al., 
2008).  Marock et al. note further that it is imperative to address the paucity of data 
relating to workplace based training which is escalated into the SSPs.  Their findings 
highlight the perverse incentives that permeate the training outputs in the levy/grants 
system (Marock et al., 2008). 
 
The perceptions of the stakeholders of the performance of the of the merSETA is 
evaluated based on these annual reports and corroborated with minutes of the 
Accounting Authority and various sub structures including the Executive Committee 
(Exco), Finance and Grants committee (F&GC) and the Chamber committees (CC).   
2.6 Capacity Building in a young democracy  
South Africa faces severe capacity constraints in policy implementation which can be 
likened to other countries at similar stages of development.  McKinley refers to South 
Africa as a young democracy with elements of ’classic’ institutional and political tensions 
(McKinley, 2014). Cognisance of this constraint needs to be taken into account when 
developing institutions, systems and procedures.  
 
Notwithstanding the role of capacity building programmes and courses, it is imperative 
that work processes aligned with predetermined goals guide capacity building 
endeavours (Bird & Heitmann 2009).  Bird and Heitmann (2009) further opine that 
capacity development implies that stakeholders have varying degrees of capacity, with 
some having more capacity than others. In order for stakeholders to effectively carry out 
their fiduciary duties it is contingent on a more holistic capacity development 
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intervention as defined by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) (cited in Bird & 
Heitmann, 2009).  Such capacity interventions “should encompass a process whereby 
both the stakeholders as well as the organisation, maintains, adapts and expands their 
ability to manage their own sustainable development” (Bird & Heitmann, 2009 p. 20).  
Furthermore, that “capacity development with its core element of learning, clearly has a 
time dimension” (Bird & Heitmann, 2009 p. 20, 21).  Lusthause et al. (cited in Bird & 
Heitmann, 2009), cite research that implies that capacity development is influenced by 
time and the stage of development of the actors, systems, processes and procedures of 
the institution which is being developed, and that at varying times some institutions may 
be capable and/or incapable of change.  This implies that rapid change may not 
culminate in positive results. 
 
Marock et al. (2008) also note that the serious nature of the role of Board members 
does not reconcile well with the part time nature of their tenure.  In addition, they 
highlight that it has become increasingly important to develop criteria for the selection of 
Board members in order to ensure that they are able to discharge their duties 
effectively.  It is imperative that changes geared towards enhancing the system occurs 
in conjunction with ensuring that the scale and scope of the SETAs mandate is not 
increased, given the SETAs capacity constraints (Marock et al., 2008).   
 
Furthermore, based on the perceptions of the stakeholders the case study investigated 
whether institutional capacity building had occurred and how it affected the institutional 
arrangements within the merSETA. Capacity building refers to changes which occur as 
a result of structural reform of systems, the development of human resources and 
strategic and business planning.  It is recognised that the SETAs operate in a complex 
political environment.  It was therefore deemed necessary to ascertain whether 
institutional change had occurred and if so whether it was championed by particular 
stakeholders (Leftwich, 2007).   
 
Cognisance should be taken of the phenomenon of public service systems which are 
being modelled on “market-like organisations of service delivery which features 
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elements such as user boards, customer choice, and stake-holderism, as well as some 
other new forms of interaction between the public sector and the citizen” (Pierre, 2009, 
p. 1).  It was therefore deemed necessary to explore and understand the stakeholder’s 
perceptions of whether these practices had been assimilated into the institutional culture 
of the merSETA.   
 
Marock et al. (2008), proffers that the complexity of the institutional design of the skills 
development system, the weaknesses in information management systems, and the 
lack of capacity are indicative of the fact that the SETAs are still at a critical stage of 
institutionalisation.   
  
The DHET Ministerial Task Team (MTT) report quotes an interviewee as commenting: 
Whatever the social ills, the SETAs are expected to respond and solve the 
problem. Whether it is skills shortages, out-of-school youth, 
unemployment, illiteracy, or university student funding, SETAs are 
expected to solve the problem (DHET 2013, p. 42). 
 
The latter sums up the tension between the lack of capacity and the scale and scope of 
the SETA mandate.  
 
It becomes apparent that a need exists for a public servant who defies the norm of 
being an emotionally detached rigorous professional and is more empathetic alongside 
his/her professional manner. He/she becomes a public servant who, according to 
Weber (cited in Coser, 2003, p. 230), could be likened to the modern judge, where…  
“He or She is a vending machine into which the pleadings are inserted together with the 
fee and which then disgorges the judgment together with the reason mechanically 
derived from the Code” (Chipkin, 2011, p. 4).   
2.7 Conclusion  
The afore-mentioned plethora of socio-economic imperatives that the SETAs are 
expected to solve occurs within the context of institutions which are “deemed to be 
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weak, vulnerable and imperfect” coupled with a lack of resources as well as poorly 
trained and unmotivated staff (Grindle, 2004, p. 526). In contexts such as these, even 
the most energetic reformers are overwhelmed by the quest for good governance 
(Grindle, 2004).  
 
The perceptions of the stakeholders is at the core of the author’s endeavours to 
understand effective governance within the SETAs. The multiple institutional challenges 
faced by the SETAs is located within the argument being advocated that the good 
governance agenda, (comprising a long list of institutional changes and capacity 
building) is perhaps an unrealistic goal for developing middle-income countries like 
South Africa.  Grindle (2007) opines that not all good governance interventions can be 
pursued and accomplished simultaneously.   
 
The summary of the literature debating the nature of good governance comprising the 
mechanisms and processes such as decision making and non-decision making, the 
complex institutional arrangements and holistic capacity building interventions, 
foregrounds the author’s quest to understand the nature of governance and institutional 
arrangements within the merSETA.  This is based on the perceptions of the 
stakeholders and informs the pursuing discussion in Chapter Five.  
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
3.1 Research Design 
 
Research can be defined as the systematic enquiry aimed at providing information to 
solve problems. The research method that was used to give expression to the enquiry 
followed a case study design that used a qualitative approach, with semi-structured 
interviews and a review of unpublished internal documents.  The author used snowball 
sampling and interviewed seven merSETA officials: the merSETA CEO, three DHET 
officials, one representative from the NUMSA6, one representative from the SEIFSA7, 
and one representative from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).  The 
approach centred on in-depth interviews with each respondent, thereby allowing for an 
understanding of the complexity that surrounds the governance and institutional 
arrangements within the merSETA.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed.  The 
findings were analysed and separated into various themes. 
   
The skills development regime, more particularly its governance framework and 
institutional arrangements, are the subject of on-going research by various academics.  
This study therefore only constitutes a small contribution to this important and topical 
subject. 
 
The study does not address either performance or monitoring and evaluation of the 
merSETA in any detail, due to the scale and scope of the SETA mandate.  However, 
                                                 
6 NUMSA is the largest metalworkers Trade union in South Africa with more than 339, 567 members (as 
at January 2014). It is an active affiliate of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the 
largest Trade union federation in South Africa .  Formed in 1987, it merged five different unions, some of 
whom had formed in the 1960s and 1970s. It is the biggest trade union (except in Eskom) in all national 
bargaining forums where it bargains. 
 
7
 The Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA) is a national employer 
Federation representing the metal and engineering industry.   SEIFSA is the umbrella body for 27 
independent employer associations - representing the diverse sectors constituting the metal and 
engineering industry.  The Associations currently have a combined membership of 2 200 companies 
employing over 220 000 hourly-paid workers. The SEIFSA membership employs 51% of the industry's 
workforce, and over 78% of all employees represented by the employer organisations party to the Metal 
and Engineering Industries’ Bargaining Council (MEIBC). 
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the perceptions of the stakeholders which are corroborated with the review of internal 
documents, lends credence to the assertion that the performance management system 
appears to lack reliability.  A separate in-depth study is required for judging whether the 
merSETA products such as the SSP, and the impact of the learnership / apprenticeship 
system,  are delivered in the most cost effective and efficient way.   
 
The study did also not address quality assurance as the current SAQA framework 
requires each SETA ETQA to develop their own quality assurance system and 
processes.  It requires that providers are accredited and that they have registered 
assessors and moderators.  There is a process of moderation and verification which is 
built into the system and requires that each programme is approved against a unit 
standard and/or a qualification.  The SETAs are responsible for numerous small 
providers (DHET, 2011). In the case of the merSETA it is in excess of 1500. An 
examination of the merSETAs quality assurance was therefore beyond the scale and 
scope of this study. 
 
The author was reliant on the various respondents to agree willingly to provide 
documents and their time for interviews.  In the main, there was excellent cooperation 
from the respondents.  Due to his unavailability the CEO of NEDLAC was not 
interviewed. 
 
The main research was qualitative fieldwork, gathering qualitative data through 
interviews.  The semi-structured interviews allowed for flexibility and probing and 
facilitated the development of interviewee responses.  The interviews were conducted at 
the location of the respondents.  In addition a documentary analysis of the merSETAs 
Annual Reports, minutes of the Governing Board, the Executive Committee, the 
Innovation, Research and Development department, and the five Chamber committees, 
for the financial years 1st March 2010 to 28th February 2013, as well as the service level 
agreement and an extract of the 2013 – 2014 Sector Skills Plan was undertaken.   
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The limitation of the research is that it is a single case study and that the purpose is 
simultaneously both descriptive and exploratory.  The author was employed in the 
capacity of Skills Planning Manager at the merSETA for the period March 2005 to 
November 2007, and is aware that subjectivity is always present in research, and of the 
impact this may have had on this research project.  This necessitated the development 
of a parallel process designed to validate that the findings and discussion were strictly 
based on the data collected during the research process. 
 
The study took the form of a case study of the merSETA, as only one of the 21 SETAs 
was subjected to a detailed intensive analysis.  The term case study is generally 
associated with either an organisation or a location.  Case studies allow for the 
utilisation of various qualitative techniques including participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, as well as data collection of an organisation’s minutes and 
reports. It allowed the author to highlight the complexity and particular nature of the 
case (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  
 
Case studies are normally qualitative in nature and geared towards providing an in-
depth description.  The qualitative methodology tends to be used to refer to forms of 
data collection and analyses, which rely on understanding with an emphasis on 
meaning, and was therefore an appropriate methodology in understanding the specific 
context in this case study.  Interpretivist methodologies include, amongst others, 
interviewing as well as observation and qualitative data analysis, which provided the 
author with an opportunity to interpret someone else’s interpretation of reality. 
3.2 Instruments for data collection and validity and reliability 
In order to address both issues of reliability (defined as being the “constructed, 
multidimensional, and ever changing realities – through which the author has the 
opportunity to interpret someone else’s interpretation of reality”) as well as validity, 
which entails “truthfully depicting the detail, a robust audit trail of the process as well as 
ensuring attention to the perspectives of those being studied” (Merriam, 1995, p. 54, 
59).  The research methods paid particular attention to sampling, data collection 
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methods, data processing and analysis, researcher subjectivity and ethics.  Each of 
these is discussed further in what follows. 
3.3 Sampling 
The sampling strategy employed was snowball sampling.  Initial contact was made with 
the CEO of the merSETA, who recommended officials within the merSETA, as well as 
stakeholders from organised business, organised labour and various government 
departments who were relevant to the research topic (Bryman & Bell, 2007). A total of 
thirteen respondents were interviewed.  They included seven officials from the 
merSETA, three merSETA stakeholders and three officials from the DHET.  This 
enabled perspectives from a range of participants with the weakness that participants 
may have selected participants with similar views to themselves. 
3.4 Data collection 
The primary method of data collection was qualitative fieldwork.  The research was 
dependent on various sources of data, including people and their experiences, 
documents and reports.  For most of the textual data, existing documents, minutes and 
reports were requested.  These were easily and readily available due to the privileged 
relationship that the author has with the merSETA. The analysis was used to validate 
and/or refute whether the decision making processes, systems, actors (stakeholders) 
and accountability corroborates the literature of governance and institutions.  This 
triangulation of data assisted the improvement of validity and reliability in the study. 
 
Semi-structured interviewing was utilised as it allowed for a fairly informal, almost 
conversation-like process.  The interview guide was thematic with specific questions 
geared towards guiding the conversation and is attached hereto as Appendix D.   
 
Individual one and a half hour interviews with members of the various stakeholder fora, 
such as the Accounting Authority and sub-committees (governing the SETA’s), within 
the merSETA, were scheduled and convened.  One interview was conducted within half 
an hour (with the respondent volunteering to a follow up telephone interview if deemed 
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necessary), due to time constraints experienced by the respondent. Two interviews 
were conducted within 45 minutes and 1 one hour respectively. 
 
The interview guide consisted of thirteen questions in total and was grouped into five 
broad themes as follows. The first question set the tone in broad terms for the interview, 
and dealt with the perceived perceptions of the SETAs performance.  The second 
question dealt with the policy transfer from the DoL to the DHET.  The third and fourth 
questions dealt with governance and institutional challenges within the SETA, and the 
fifth question requested the respondents to comment on the advice they would provide 
relating to the challenges identified in the previous questions.   
 
The author attempted to ensure that the interviews were not interrogative but that it 
rather took the format of a conversation.  The semi-structured nature of the interview 
meant that all the respondents were asked the same questions.  The author had very 
little control over the responses, but in some instances had to probe in order for the 
respondents to elaborate and/or to follow through on a particular line of thinking.  The 
questions in the main were geared to solicit the respondents opinions based on their 
particular experience as well as some background information. 
 
The author wishes to acknowledge this type of interviewing when compared to other 
interviewing tools such as questionnaires and surveys, which did present some 
drawbacks.  It became apparent during the interviewing process that the respondents 
did not possess a standardised response to the questions.  The author was able to 
develop a greater understanding of the process, through the process, and therefore 
acknowledges that she was not a neutral data collector but that data collection and 
interpretation took place simultaneously. 
 
The interviews were recorded and notes were kept.  Thereafter the tape recordings 
were transcribed as a series of verbatim conversations for analysis.   
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3.5  Data processing and analysis 
All the interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded.  The data were sorted and 
arranged into a consolidated word processing document (totalling 291 pages) following 
the order of the interview guide.  Themes were developed from the coding and given 
meaning as they emerged.  The two key features in analysing the data entailed the 
development of theory out of the data and secondly, that the process of collection of the 
data required repeatedly referring back to both the theory and analysis (Bryman & Bell, 
2007). 
 
Analysis and coding of the transcripts required the reading and rereading of the 
transcripts to ensure familiarity with the material.  Due to the volume of the transcribed 
texts, it required that selective coding be utilised, through the selection of core concepts, 
i.e. governance, and institutions.  These were then systematically related to other 
categories, including:  compliance, mandate, decision making, transparency, 
stakeholder interests; validating those relationships, and finally filling in categories that 
required further refinement and development.  These included categories such as 
conflicting expenditure directives impacting on internal decision making; unilateral 
directives culminating in ’mission creep’, capacity, non-decision making, conflicting 
interests, and composition of structures (Bryman & Bell, 2007).   
 
The consolidated document referred to above was organised into three columns, the 
first assigned to the interviewee to whom codes were assigned to ensure confidentiality 
and anonymity.  The second column contained the actual interview transcription sorted 
per category / sub-category.  And the third column contained the code which was 
assigned: for example, governance Gov00, ‘mission creep’ Gov03 3, Institutional 
arrangements Ins00, principals Ins01, conflict of interest Ins03 1, decision making 
Ins08, advice to merSETA Ins17 12. (See Appendix E.)  The advanced search and find 
function was utilised to traverse the consolidated document culminating in the extracts 
of interviews presented as data in Chapter Four.  
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A similar manual process was adopted for the analysis and coding of the minutes and 
Terms of Reference of the merSETA structures, the Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
and the Strategic Plan (SP) listed in the schedule of minutes attached hereto as 
Appendix F.  Data which corroborated the transcripts were extracted and coded. Due to 
the volume of the internal documents, it required that selective coding be utilised, 
through the selection of core concepts, i.e. governance, and institutions.  These were 
then systematically related to other categories, including,  compliance, mandate, 
decision making, transparency, stakeholder interests; validating those relationships, and 
finally filling in categories that required further refinement and development.  These 
included categories such as conflicting expenditure directives impacting on internal 
decision making; unilateral directives culminating in ‘mission creep’, capacity, non-
decision making, conflicting interests, and composition of structures. 
 
Bryman and Bell’s (2007) definition of constructivism underpinned the analysis, in that 
“the manner in which these social actors impact on the social phenomena and their 
meanings”, is encapsulated in the author’s version of this “social reality, rather than one 
that can be regarded as definitive” (Bryman & Bell, 2007, p. 23).  This was to ensure 
that the framework recognised the value of peoples’ views, understandings and 
experiences. In conclusion, own accounts based on information gleaned from 
observations during the interviews were used to bring depth to the analysis. 
3.6 Subjectivity or Researcher bias 
The author was aware of the potential effects as a researcher as she had been a 
colleague of some of the interviewees.  This provided the author with an advantage in 
relation to the researcher/respondent relationship, as there was an open and 
established rapport which facilitated getting the interviews done.   
3.7 Ethical considerations 
The merSETA CEO was approached for permission to conduct the case study, to 
identify and recommend the relevant stakeholders, as well as to obtain permission for 
access to minutes and reports of the various merSETA structures. 
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The respondents were provided with information pertaining to the research prior to 
commencement of the interviews.  They were also assured of anonymity and 
confidentiality.  
 
Individual interviews commenced on the 8th November 2013 until the 17th December 
2013.  The interview schedule is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
 
The author was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement with the proviso that all 
documents obtained from the merSETA would be returned within 120 days of 
submission of the research report. 
 
All digitally recorded and transcribed research data will be destroyed on completion of 
the research. 
 
Various respondents enquired about confidentiality and anonymity of the process, which 
highlighted the fact that tensions existed in the research process which needed to be 
addressed.  This tension could be likened to what Bryman and Bell (2007) refer to as 
the pursuit of knowledge and the right of interviewees, advising that the rights of 
individuals should be upheld. This also manifests in the ethical dilemma of the right to 
privacy versus the right to know.  In order to address these concerns the author 
developed a coding frame to identify respondents in the data set in the Interview 
Schedule attached hereto as Appendix B. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the research design and how the research processes was 
undertaken.  The research focused on a qualitative approach as a methodology.  
Snowball sampling was employed and a total of thirteen respondents were interviewed.  
The primary source of data was derived from the interviews and was corroborated with 
internal documentary data. 
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4. PRESENTATION OF DATA  
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter comprises of the presentation of the data derived from the process of 
interviewing.  Data are discussed in the manner that the respondents provided the data 
in respect of the questions.  
4.2 Interviewee responses 
4.2.1 Public perceptions of performance of SETAs 
The majority of respondents were of the opinion that the SETAs were mainly seen to be 
ineffective, as not delivering on their mandate, and of sitting on large amounts of funds.  
SETAs were seen to be ineffective primarily as a result of not having skilled and 
competent staff that is knowledgeable of the learning programmes. The SETA system 
was seen to be overly bureaucratic and to deliver training which was not aligned with 
the needs of industry.  Ineffective corporate governance was cited as another reason for 
the negative perceptions of SETAs.  Most respondents cited the lack of information and 
an ineffective communication strategy as another reason for the varying perceptions of 
the SETAs, with respondent SH09 commenting that perceptions varied from urban to 
rural areas.  This respondent’s view included that the opposition party’s politics also 
contributed to the negative perceptions.  Another respondent contextualised the 
negative perceptions of the SETAs as a remnant of the Apartheid legacy in the following 
quote:  
 
That the negative perceptions was as a result of them [the SETAs] being publicly 
funded entities; that they were seen not to be delivering the artisans that the 
country needs fast;  that … you sat with a past right up to the year 2000, where 
education was so fragmented and so racialised that only a small minority, a 
privileged few got technical and skills education to artisanship’s, majority being 
white South Africans followed by Coloured's and Indian, and the majority of this 
country, Blacks, were not part of that  …, and so on, so we did not produce many 
artisans from the late ‘80’s right up to 1999, 2000 when the Skills Development 
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Act was enacted in 1998.  Companies who traditionally trained upon the 
introduction of the 1% levy began to abandon the role of training.  They just 
abdicated that responsibility because government was now seen as taking over 
that responsibility, so SETAs then got tainted with this.  No training was 
happening, money was not being spent, and because of the whole public 
perception of corruption in this country, one or two SETAs fell into that trap early 
(SH10).  
 
The majority of respondents however, were of the opinion that the merSETA was one of 
the better performing SETAs, with most respondents acknowledging some weaknesses 
with regard to client services, and administrative processes.   
 
In this regard, Respondent SH07, expressed the view that the SETAs were performing 
well however they lacked an effective public relations strategy to counter the negative 
perceptions attributed to some of the SETAs who had been placed under administration 
where funds had been misappropriated.  This respondent qualified the former by 
pointing out that the image of the merSETA was more accurate amongst those such as 
stakeholders, the DHET and Treasury who were privy to the successes of the 
merSETA. 
 
This respondent was of the view that the merSETA should embark on a marketing 
campaign to raise awareness of their success stories, as merSETA was one of the few 
institutions of excellence within the SETA space and that it was important to articulate 
that.  The SARS (South African Revenue Services) television advertisements were 
singled out as an effective public relations campaign that the merSETA should consider 
in order to enhance perceptions within the public domain. 
 
The majority of respondents were of the opinion that the SETAs were plagued by 
negative perceptions in the public domain.  The SETAs were perceived to be overly 
bureaucratic and failing to deliver training which was aligned with the needs of industry. 
Most of the respondents however were of the view that the merSETA was one of the 
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better performing SETAs.  An increase in public relations focussing on the success 
stories was seen as important to enhance the image of the merSETA. 
4.2.2 Policy transfer from the DoL to the DHET 
Most of the respondents welcomed the policy transfer from the DHET to the DoL, as it 
was seen to give effect to fostering greater integration and synergy within education and 
training.  One respondent commented that  “Our education systems were too 
fragmented in that you had the university education system, you had technical 
education, which is our further education and training colleges at that time, (it fell under 
the Department of Education at the time), and then you had the Department of Labour 
where SETAs reported there.  It was a political problem” (SH10). 
 
Recognition that the process was fraught was highlighted by Respondent SH13.  The 
restructuring that had taken place at governance level caused contestation about the 
composition of the boards and the appointment of the chairperson.  This respondent 
was of the view that in the initial stage of the process there had been resistance from 
the SETAs but ultimately it was accepted that the SETAs are not entities each operating 
on their own, but public institutions accountable to all of the elements including the state 
and labour.  
 
It was recognised that the increased accountability derived from the policy transfer was 
positive, more particularly with regard to ensuring that the SETAs spend should be 
directed towards learnerships linked to a qualification.  This sentiment was aptly 
captured by Respondent SH10 who commented that: “…that policy transfer now meant 
that the SETA work being infused into the two different departments meant more control 
from the DHET than we had before. Yes, in terms of responsibility and accountability.  
We now had to account to the Ministry, much more direct than we did in the past” 
(SH10).   
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The quality and impact of training and return on investment was highlighted as an area 
where greater accountability could be attained through direct accounting to the Minister 
of the DHET.  
 
Most of the respondents agreed that the transition from the DoL to the DHET had 
happened smoothly.  However one respondent noted that it had “impacted on the 
management of learners, and apprenticeship contracts, and all of those things, some 
programmes being moved from the DoL to the DHET, when the DHET is not ready, 
created a problem for SETAs” (SH04). 
 
Another respondent observed that, with the shift from the DoL, the SETAs had lost 
touch with the aspect of the labour market implications of skills. Examples cited were, 
...”the effect on wages, of skills on wages, or the determination of skills in mines through 
a calculation of what the impact would be on the cost structures of companies, etc.  
Those kinds of things have sort of gotten lost” (SH13).  
 
The majority of respondents welcomed having to report to only one line ministry (the 
DHET) with the same reporting processes and procedures.  
 
Two respondents expressed concern about the reporting framework of the newly 
established QCTO.  In particular, concern was raised with respect to the time lags in 
certification as well as the standardisation of assessment tools. As the Minister was only 
due to sign off on this after 2014 it was seen to be “putting the system in a bit of a limbo, 
and we continue with business as usual, taking note of what is happening, and so we’ve 
got one foot in the old system, and one in the new system, which makes it slightly 
complicated” (SH02). 
 
Respondents noted the higher profile that the Minister was giving to FET institutions.  
 
It is prudent to note that the policy transfer from the DoL to the DHET was not without its 
challenges.  The most significant challenge was the time lags experienced in 
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certification as well as the standardisation of assessment tools.  Notwithstanding the 
initial resistance from SETAs, the policy transfer process was relatively smooth, bringing 
about greater integration and synergy between education and training and with 
increased responsibility and accountability to the DHET. 
4.2.3 Key governance challenges confronting stakeholders 
Most of the respondents were of the view that the key governance challenge was 
structural, i.e., the inherent conflict of interest between organised labour and organised 
business. The role of the DHET as well as that of National Treasury solicited criticism 
for being prescriptive in terms of unilaterally raising targets and capping expenditure in 
respect of administration costs.  Respondent SH07 referred to this as “a clash between 
the political mandate of what SETAs are meant to perform and the other regulations, for 
instance Treasury regulations” and that the reprioritization of targets and funds as in the 
case of reducing administration costs from 10% to 7.5% was literally changing the 
landscape.   
 
Respondent SH05 highlighted Treasury having capped administration expenses, where 
previously SETAs were allowed to utilise 10% of budget in respect of their 
administrative spend. Respondent SH08 cited the example of the DHET having 
requested the SETAs across the board to contribute R2 billion towards the FETs 
refurbishment.  Respondent SH03 questioned, ...”now, why should the discretionary 
grant be directed from the Department and not stakeholders?” adding that … “they 
requested that 4.75% of the discretionary grants must be ring-fenced, so we’ve had to 
go and look at how to readjust the budget and cut back to make money available for 
FET capex (capital expenditure)”.   
 
Another respondent viewed the increase in targets, the demands on the SETAs 
finances, and the cutting of expenditure, “as a real major governance challenge”.  
Another respondent criticised the determination of targets externally (NSDSIII by the 
DHET) as not providing the “governors”, as the Accounting Authority members to “direct 
how and where and what the merSETA will focus on”.  This respondent questioned the 
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oversight role from a governance perspective (of the Accounting Authority), adding that 
if the Board is “relatively independent surely they should have the discretion to decide 
where and how the money should be spent?” (SH03).  
 
The SETAs are required to report to the Executive Authority (the DHET), National 
Treasury in terms of the PFMA, as well as to the merSETA Accounting Authority.  
Respondent SH07 likened this to “having too many masters to please” within a context 
of political and financial imperatives being prescribed by the Accounting Executive.  This 
was elaborated through citing the fact that the SETAs were required to ensure that 
industry needs were addressed within the context of these “political pressures”.  This 
respondent pointed out that the former two factors combined with the prevailing financial 
pressures compromised the merSETA.  This phenomena was described as three pillars 
being in conflict with one another, which presented the SETA with its “biggest challenge 
at the moment” (SH07).     
 
The ‘too many masters to please’ phenomenon was further emphasised by Respondent 
Sh07, and echoed by Respondent SH05 stating that “I think for me it is one of the 
biggest governance challenges of the SETA.  A lot of it is legislative stuff.  At times I 
would say there’s probably a clash between the political mandate of what SETAs are 
meant to perform and other regulatory [requirements], for instance Treasury 
regulations”.  This respondent highlighted the disconnection between having to deliver 
on social imperatives while not having full control of the merSETA budget.  The element 
of discretion in the allocation of funds was also being eroded through National Treasury 
capping expenditure as well as the practise of retention of surplus funds.  This conflict 
between the directives emanating from the two ministries was seen to affect 
governance. 
 
One respondent was of the opinion that there were no governance challenges as the 
merSETA had all its governance mechanisms in place, i.e., functioning structures of the 
Accounting Authority and Executive Committee, and the fact that all senior management 
positions were filled (SH06).  Another respondent defined governance only in terms of 
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the SETAs fiduciary responsibility insofar as it is exercising its oversight role as a 
Section 3a entity, in managing public funds.  Another respondent commended the 
merSETA for sanctioning a previous employee found guilty of the mis-appropriation of 
funds.  Two respondents emphasised the lack of the requisite competencies of 
stakeholders tasked with the responsibility of governance. This was described by 
Respondent SH10 as lacking in “the necessary care, skill, understanding, and attention 
to what he or she has to look at.  ...whereas if it was a private stakeholder board you 
bring the experts in, here you’re bringing representatives in, and representatives are not 
always specialists” (SH10).      
 
Two respondents lamented stakeholders for unaccountable behaviour in respect of 
attendance of meetings noting that the Accounting Authorities practice of remunerating 
stakeholders for attendance at some meetings may inadvertently have created perverse 
incentives.  Respondent SH05 questioned the value gained by the SETA as a result of 
the attendance of stakeholder representatives at numerous meetings.  
 
The lack of effective communication flows between stakeholders was seen as an 
impediment to good governance.  In this respect respondent SH03 proffered the view 
that ...“From a governance perspective look I think what I find is communication is quite 
open. Members are able to engage are able to question where we raise concerns or 
offer suggestions the office you know on most occasions will take up the situation”.     
 
The major perceptions of governance challenges emanating from the data are, first the 
inherent conflict of interest between organised labour and organised business.  Second, 
the conflicting directives received from the DHET and National Treasury in respect of 
expenditure and targets.  Third, the statutory requirements of having to report to 
different government line departments, namely the DHET and the National Treasury.  
Fourth,  the ‘too many masters to please’ phenomenon.  Fifth, the lack of specialist 
stakeholder’s serving on the Accounting Authority.  These challenges collectively were 
considered to present the major impediments in the merSETAs quest for good 
governance.   
 56 
4.2.4 Key responsibilities of stakeholders 
Most respondents were of the view that it was imperative that the stakeholders 
understood the business of the merSETA, and that they were able to exercise oversight 
of the merSETAs performance against the Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the 
DHET.  One respondent argued that “… for me that is fundamental, the common 
stakeholder responsibility across the board whether you are in labour or the employer 
… is to ensure that we have an impact and we train for employability and contribute to 
the economy” (SH07).  Most respondents emphasised the importance of stakeholders 
participating in the merSETA in order to understand the challenges and where funding 
should be channelled.  In this regard, one respondent quoted a constituent member as 
saying that: “If you want the SETA to work you have to be involved in it, so you have to 
be a responsible stakeholder and an active participant” (SH03).  
 
The majority of respondents were of the view that the stakeholders were responsible for 
influencing the sector skills processes, with one respondent emphasising that “our 
message to our partners is please ensure that your data is accurate” (SH03). 
Respondent SH10 highlighted “the need for a board that is au fait with what happens in 
education and training, not only in South Africa, but what are the trends in the world, 
where are we moving towards?” adding that there was a need for a board that 
understands their fiduciary responsibilities, as well as their transformative 
responsibilities.  A few respondents highlighted the need for stakeholders to provide 
subject matter expertise to the ETQA committee and to approve certain policies and 
procedures that deal with quality assurance.  
 
Two respondents did not comment as they did not participate in merSETA structures. 
 
Key responsibilities identified by respondents included understanding the business of 
the merSETA, and to be able to exercise oversight regarding performance, as well as to 
participate and provide strategic input into sector planning processes. Being au fait with 
national and international education and training trends were identified as additional key 
responsibilities of stakeholders. 
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4.2.5 Key competencies of stakeholders 
Most of the respondents were of the view that the core competencies included the 
ability to understand strategic issues, being au fait with “national priorities, economic 
factors and economic drivers, locally and globally, and to be well versed, competent and 
financially literate” (SH08).  One respondent opined that there was no point to bring in 
somebody that sits in finance and to ask them to comment on curriculum development. 
This respondent further qualified that ”in the event that you appoint somebody from the 
shop-floor whose function is to work on a specific machine and we are asking them to 
analyse financial statements that contain figures up to a billion rand how would we 
capacitate that individual?” (SH03). 
 
One respondent was of the view that the minimum criteria should be that stakeholders 
are experts from their sectors, and that they understand the complexity of the skills 
development system.  Another respondent expressed the view that a key competency is 
that stakeholders have to be actively involved in training and that they need to 
understand the training cycle.   
 
Two respondents were of the view that stakeholders should possess the ability to 
understand the legislative environment.  It was noted that the different structures 
required varying skills sets, ranging from research and analytic skills to financial 
acumen.  Another respondent added that the skills set required of managers was that 
they had to be very understanding of the economic situation of the country, it’s social 
situation, the demographic challenges, with race,  gender and lastly the unique 
challenge of South Africa.  
 
In the main, most respondents were of the opinion that the merSETA stakeholders were 
knowledgeable and competent, with respondent SH05 qualifying that knowledge and 
experience are not necessarily qualifications, but that stakeholders “should know what 
exactly it is they are going to present, what it is they are representing and so on and so 
on”.   
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Respondent SH04 was of the view that as the Board had been trimmed down 
particularly with the ministerial appointees people with special expertise and skill now 
served on the Board.  This respondent reflected on the fact that previously members 
were deployed and had to find their way around the issues. It was generally recognised 
that members of the Accounting Authority should be appointed on merit.  
 
An opposing point of view was proffered by Respondent SH08 that the merSETA had a 
number of board and committee members who actually just attended meetings and kept 
quiet.  This respondent further stated that apparently there were some members whose 
voices had not been heard for a couple of years, adding that the “more brave ones will 
be constantly asking for clarity and information, which is a good thing” (SH08).   
 
Three respondents were of the view that not all the stakeholders possessed the 
required competencies within the merSETA, with one respondent noting that the 
weaknesses occurred as a result of the “level of representation on the Board rather than 
the architecture of the board itself”, and expressing the desire to “get more senior 
players from both sides to be playing in that space” (SH01). 
  
Another respondent pointed out the differences between the existing levels of 
competency on the various structures, noting that at the chamber level worker leaders 
were elected, re-elected or not elected at all at four yearly intervals and that this had 
resulted in new stakeholder representatives serving on some structures (SH04).  
Cognisance was also taken of the fact that members resign and/or retire and by virtue 
of the fact that constituencies appoint representatives said representatives may not 
necessarily possess the requisite mix of skills to serve on the Accounting Authority and 
the various sub-committees. 
 
Sector expertise was cited as the key competency required of stakeholders.  In addition 
to which strategic orientation, financial acumen, and the competence to represent 
constituent interests adequately was identified as key competencies.  The recent 
nomination of independent members to the merSETA Accounting Authority was 
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welcomed with the need for more strategic leaders participating within the merSETA 
being identified. 
4.2.6 Scale and scope of the merSETA mandate 
Respondent SH05 aptly summarised the majority view of respondents by commenting 
that the financial constraints that had been placed on the SETAs had resulted in 
unrealistic expectations.   
 
Most of the respondents lamented the fact that the NSDSIII, encompassing 19 
outcomes and 39 outputs, including providing support to CBOs and NGOs the 
recapitalisation of FET colleges and rural development, was unrealistic.  Respondent 
SH10 was of the opinion that  
your biggest problem was that the SETAs were expected to resolve probably four 
hundred years of ills in this country in a small period of time.  Impossible and that 
the scope is to ensure that we have the right form of skills we needed and if 
needed that we do ensure that qualifications are developed and people are then 
trained accordingly and that the monies get disbursed. But if you look at the scale 
last year when we went on a discretionary grant request our request was R3.8 
billion.  That’s what we got back from businesses, companies and individuals.  
What could we afford? R425 million. 
 
Respondent SH03 echoed these sentiments adding that they had no objection to 
NSDSIII but that caution should be exercised with regard to the issue of ‘mission creep’. 
 
This respondent commented that it was clear that the mandate surpassed skills 
development if SETAs were being requested to also support the functions of the 
Department of Basic Education such as maths and science at high schools.     
 
A common concern expressed by most of the respondents was the conundrum the 
merSETA faced where budgets have been aligned with the targets in the Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) and then having additional targets prescribed by the DHET.  This was 
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highlighted through the example of the request received from the DHET to fund a career 
guidance awareness day in the Eastern Cape at short notice.  One of the respondents 
questioned the spend on this intervention and whether any of the learners attending the 
career day would actually enter their industry. 
 
Two respondents were of the view that the SETA mandate was not unrealistic with 
respondent SH09 commenting that the mandate was not the SETAs choice but rather 
that it was determined “by our economic system”, given the present skills shortages.  
Respondent SH04 welcomed the broader scope commenting that “The NSDSIII is 
saying skills development is not about production only, but it should also be about 
empowering people to earn a living”.  This respondent added that rural development is 
not necessarily about agriculture, but also about developing rural areas given the fact 
that 60% of workers in factories, who contribute to the wealth of the country, are from 
the rural areas.  It was felt that the SETAs should develop interventions for the 
unemployed who returned to rural areas to “go back home and find a factory there”.  
This perspective demonstrates the political tension between the socio-economic 
mandate and the SETA mandate.  
 
Respondent SH13 was of the view that:  “basically it boiled down to whether the 
mandate [of the SETAs] is expanded or reduced”.   This was seen to be tinkering with 
the system as a fear existed that given the billions of Rands’ of investment in the SETAs 
that it [the SETAs] could not just be “dismantled and then start from scratch”.  
Respondent SH10 was of the view that the scope was no longer understood and 
therefore the scale of the SETAs had become enormous, adding that SETAs are not 
knowledgeable in creating businesses so “why do you lump them with SMMEs?  What 
they’ve got to do is ensure that there’s training but to create new ventures that’s not a 
SETAs business”.  
 
Respondent SH07 posited that the SETAs were requested to deliver services to the 
unemployed on a bigger spectrum.  It was recognised that it was necessary to develop 
interventions for both retrenched workers as well as the youth, however the role of the 
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UIF (Unemployment Insurance Fund) within skills development was questioned.  This 
respondent was also of the view that bursaries should not be at the core or a target of 
the SETAs as other government structures and entities sole mandate was to fund 
learners.  It was pointed out that duplication existed between different government 
departments and structures. Respondent SH01 echoed the aforementioned sentiments 
and was of the view that some of the aforementioned targets “belong more naturally to 
the National Skills Fund”.  
 
The tension between the socio economic mandate and the SETA mandate was 
apparent in the diverse views expressed.  This ranged from support for the 
transformative agenda of NSDSIII and caution being expressed regarding the oft-cited 
’mission creep’.  Those stakeholders who erred on the side of caution highlighted the 
fact that the SETAs were expected to do a lot with limited resources.  Moreover some 
stakeholders were of the view that a number of targets such as ABET, support for 
SMME’s, and rural development was the responsibility of departments such as the 
Department of Education, the Department of Trade and Industry and the NSF. 
4.2.7 Key institutional challenges facing merSETA  
Two respondents raised the issue of communication as a challenge.  Respondent SH04 
expressed caution regarding the decision-making processes of the Accounting 
Authority, Exco and Management committee (Manco), its impact and the fact that lack 
of communication had stymied the potential for alternative decisions. 
 
Concern was also expressed by Respondent SH03 about the restructuring process 
within the merSETA and whether it would disrupt activities and the challenges it could 
present in terms of continuity. 
 
Most of the respondents raised concerns about the DHET processes which resulted in 
the decision to decrease the mandatory grant from 50% to 20% and the adverse impact 
on the SETAs.  
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Most respondents were concerned about the data management migration process at 
the merSETA with Respondent SH03 expressing frustration about the delays in being 
able to access statistics for apprentices in the sector.  Furthermore “the confusion 
around the data migration process during the WSP (Workplace Skills Plan) submission 
where people didn’t know whether they were submitting to data net whether they were 
submitting to SMS (SETA Management System) and they couldn’t access files was 
described as chaotic”.   The outsourcing of the data management system also posed a 
challenge in terms of efficient access to information.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation was identified as a challenge with the qualification of 
monitoring and evaluation for impact and not simply monitoring and evaluation to see if 
profit is being derived. 
 
Human resources was identified as a challenge according to respondent SH10 as 
people were not adequately trained for this new educational system and that it took 
quite a bit of time for people to get to understand how the SETAs function.  
 
Most respondents cited the demand for services within the context of a decreasing 
funding base as presenting the greatest institutional challenge.  It was felt that “if you 
invest R1, you can’t expect R3 out of it you should get back your R1 plus your interest” 
(SH10). 
 
Most respondents cited additional systemic challenges including bureaucratic 
processes. 
 
The key institutional challenges which were identified included: (1) systems and 
procedures such as the data management system (MIS), (2) bureaucratic red tape (3) 
communication, (4) monitoring and evaluation, with disquiet being expressed regarding 
the potential disruption due to the merSETAs restructuring process.  The decreasing 
funding base, most notably, its potential impact on the administration line item in the 
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merSETA budget and its potentially adverse effect on human resources was also 
highlighted as a concern. 
4.2.8 Decision making within the merSETA 
Five respondents were unable to comment as they were not directly involved in the 
decision-making structures of the merSETA such as the Accounting Authority and the 
Exco.  However, two of these respondents were of the view that the merSETAs decision 
making processes were guided by policies and procedures embedded within legislation, 
as well as within internal policies such as the delegation of authority prescribed within 
the merSETA Constitution and the Accounting Authority Charter. 
 
Respondent SH08 expressed concern about the occurrences of time-lags in decision 
making which was as a result of the constraints of either decentralised decision making 
and/or delegation of authority.   
 
The phenomena of referral of agenda items to various structures appears to have 
permeated through all the structures of the merSETA.  This became apparent during the 
process of tracking the decision making processes of the agenda Item Information 
Technology strategy.  The discussion on the Information Technology strategy8 was 
raised on the 29th April 2010 and was either referred, deferred and escalated to 
structures including the Accounting Authority, the Exco, the Finance and Grants 
Committee and to the Quarterly Monitoring and Reporting meeting (QMR). This process 
is captured in Appendix G.   
 
Tracking the decision making process of the MIS was illuminating given the fact that it 
had been identified as high risk, but more importantly, that various respondents had 
expressed frustration in the delays and bottlenecks experienced in the data migration 
process and the concomitant service delivery challenges this had presented.  
 
                                                 
8 The Information Technology strategy is referred to as the MIS for the purposes of this discussion. 
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These challenges included extracting reliable statistics for companies as well as 
populating the SSP.  The most revealing point was that the responsibility for tracking of 
the risk assessment was delegated to the QMR.  This is a non-decision making, non-
constitutional structure with no formal representation from either the Accounting 
Authority or the Exco.  The ability to track and exercise oversight (anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the spend on MIS system was in excess of a few million Rands) take 
responsibility and hold the service provider and others accountable is questionable if 
oversight, responsibility and accountability is dispersed within the organisation.     
 
The review of the minutes of the various fora revealed that numerous other agenda 
items were referred, deferred and/or escalated to other fora.  
 
Most notably the issues which were referred, deferred and/or escalated to other fora 
were strategic issues requiring high level intervention such as:  
The concern regarding the fact that unemployed learners benefited more from the levy 
grant system than employed learners (merSETA min, 2011b, 2012a);   
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Accounting Authority (merSETA min, 2010a);   
The NSDSIII (merSETA min, 2011c);  
The organisational structure (merSETA min, 2010b, 2011d, 2012b);  
Mandatory and Discretionary Grant criteria (merSETA min, 2011e, 2011f, 2011g); and 
the Auto chambers concern regarding the reasons for non-placement of qualified 
artisans and the quality of training (merSETA min, 2012b).  All of these items were 
referred to various strategic planning sessions.   
 
The annual strategic planning meetings are not provided for in the constitutional 
structure of the merSETA therefore the reports of these meetings did not form part of 
the review of the documents of this case study.  However, based on the review of the 
minutes of the merSETA structures, many of these issues were discussed at 
subsequent meetings of constitutional structures.  An example is the unemployed / 
employed learners agenda item which was referred to a strategic planning session on 
the 3rd August 2011 and to another strategic planning session on the 24th July 2012.   
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It is important to note that reference was made to only one report back from these 
strategic planning sessions.  This report back was to the Accounting Authority meeting 
of the 20th September 2011.  The report back highlights that,  
The 29 key strategic issues identified and discussed at the Strategic Planning 
Session have been limited to 5 strategic objectives for the next 5 years from 
2011/12 to 2015/16 to align merSETA with NSDSIII, being: 
Positioning merSETA for 2016 and beyond in demonstrating the impact of skill 
levy and the utilization and application thereof; 
Demonstrating the impact of skills development projects and programmes in 
terms of progression, efficiencies, productivity and socio-economic imperatives; 
Advancing public/public and public/private partnerships; 
Continuing to build on the culture of good governance prevailing at merSETA; 
Improving service delivery in terms of the stakeholders (merSETA min, 2011h). 
 
There was no indication whether the various issues outlined after the example of the 
MIS decision making processes above had been discussed and/or resolved.  
 
Respondent SH04 provided detailed illustration of decision making which corroborates 
the above stated examples and is indicative of the different organisational cultures 
permeating the various structures.  This respondent referred to decision making as 
being consultative and that once “everybody has taken a bite on it, once you all agree, 
that’s how a decision is taken and is now resolved”.  
 
Respondent SH03 commented on what would appear to be ambiguity of the role and 
responsibilities of advisory structures such as the Chambers. This respondent lamented 
the fact that stakeholders had very little input in terms of the direction of the merSETA, 
as the perception existed that everything had been decided by the time they got to the 
meeting of the chambers.  The value of attendance and participation at Chamber 
meetings was questioned. 
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Respondent SH05 summarised a widely held view that operational decision making in 
respect of the procurement process and mandatory grant system was efficient as it 
generally occurred within accordance of the various statues such as the PFMA.   
 
Disquiet was expressed regarding the decisions that had emanated from the 
restructuring process as it was felt that it had occurred without the necessary 
consultation despite the involvement of the employee trade union.  
 
One respondent succinctly raised conflict of interests impeding efficient decision 
making, where decisions are not made due to the fact that certain stakeholders felt that 
they were disadvantaged.  This respondent lamented the fact that “robust debates can 
go on and on into the second or third quarter simply because all parties are not 
necessarily in agreement with that decision” (SH07). 
  
The decision-making processes within the merSETA highlights the fundamental fault 
line of the hybrid nature of the organisation.  The different organisational cultures have 
permeated almost all structures of the merSETA, and have at times impeded efficient 
decision-making processes. This phenomenon became apparent during the process of 
corroborating various respondents views on decision making with observations gleaned 
from the review of minutes of the various fora.  The diverse expectations from various 
stakeholder groupings range from frustration with lengthy decision making processes 
(which in the example of the MIS issue illustrated above was drawn out over the entire 
review period of this case study) to being comfortable that these processes incorporated 
consultation, transparency and participation.  This was likened to “everybody could have 
a bite of the issues, resolve it and then make a decision (SH04)”.  Most notably was the 
observation that what was lacking in the SETAs was evidence based decision making 
(SH01).  
4.2.9 Rules and procedures governing the merSETA 
The majority of respondents cited the following legislation, regulations, and policies and 
procedures as those governing the merSETA: i.e. the Skills Development Act, the Skills 
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Development Levies Act, the Public Finance Management Act, the Employment Equity 
Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, National Treasury Regulations, the 
Human Resources Development Strategy, the South African Qualifications Authority 
(SAQA), and the NSDSIII.  In addition, the merSETA was guided by the SLA with the 
DHET.   
 
Respondent SH07 explained that the governance team had developed …  
what we call a compliance register which actually has a detailed list of the Acts 
and regulations that we comply with and out of that we have taken certain 
extracts which are important and pertinent to the merSETA to ensure compliance 
and where there is areas of non-compliance reasons being provided and what 
plans are in place, that sort of thing. 
 
With regard to reporting requirements most respondents cited the Strategic Plan (which 
is an appendix of the 5 year SSP) and the annual plans, as guiding the operational 
activities of the organisation. Respondent SH08 posited that the latter should be aligned 
with the SIPS (Strategic Infrastructure Projects) to ensure support to strategic integrated 
projects at a national level.  Respondent SH05 pointed out that as artisans are not 
covered by the SDA, sections of the Manpower Training Act were still applicable, 
deriding the fact that some apartheid era acts were still operative.   
 
Respondents SH04 and SH11 cited internal policies and procedures emanating from 
structures such as the Audit and Risk committee, as well as the terms of reference 
(TOR) of structures such as the merSETA chambers and regional committees as also 
being key compliance mechanisms.   
 
Three respondents were unable to respond as they did not participate in merSETA 
structures. 
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Respondent SH04 added that the merSETA had developed, amongst others, funding 
guidelines for the retrenched workers project and training layoff scheme, as well as 
implemented various internal policies on for example, travel and accommodation.  
 
A general concern was raised by Respondent SH03 regarding all sector SETAs having 
become so administratively orientated and so bureaucratic that it actually prevents 
meaningful engagement with the institutions.  Respondent SH10 was of the view that it 
was not only the merSETA but the entire SETA domain where bureaucracy necessarily 
existed with regard to processes such as the registration of learnerships, verification of 
credits, and disbursement of funds.  
 
To this end, Respondent SH03 cited the following example: “one of the most ardent 
supporters of skills development in this country, a SEIFSA member a close partner of 
merSETA in several training projects was declined a discretionary grant on the basis of 
training committee minutes.  Now if you take your stakeholders seriously surely that’s 
not a bureaucratic element that should stop them from participating in the skills system”.  
 
Frustration was expressed by Respondent SH04 regarding the administrative 
challenges experienced by trainers at the coal face of skills delivery.  Likewise, the time 
lags experienced in certification of learners (as a result of the transition from the DoL to 
the DHET) was highlighted as a concern by this respondent.  
 
Numerous other examples which were cited by respondents, such as unemployed 
workers having to provide documentation from employers in order to be assessed, 
illustrated that the administrative burden of the merSETA was too high. 
 
In addition, bureaucratic negotiations were seen to hinder the roll out of projects with 
Respondent SH13 suggesting that there was a need to understand the needs of 
stakeholders and how to integrate them besides just getting them onto a structure.  
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In the main, the merSETA conforms with various rules and procedures as enshrined 
within the relevant statutes and charters, however, bureaucracy was seen to pose a 
major impediment in the merSETAs quest to deliver on their mandate. 
4.2.10 Administrative processes and procedures 
Most respondents posited that the merSETA had efficient administrative systems and 
procedures in place. This was attributed to the fact that the organisation had established 
a governance unit to provide support to the executive structures, as well as appointed a 
chamber coordinator to provide support to the chambers and regions.  This was to 
ensure that notifications and meeting packs were distributed within the prescribed time-
frames, that the decision lists were compiled and that issues escalated from the various 
structures were included on the agendas of the relevant structures. The supply chain 
manager was responsible for providing support for procurement services, adding that 
this unit acted as its secretariat. 
 
Most respondents welcomed scheduling of meetings a year in advance as it facilitated 
planning, preparation and time management.   
 
Two respondents were unable to comment as they did not participate in decision 
making structures. 
 
Respondent (SH04) lamented the fact that there are other administrative processes 
besides 
issuing of packs and all that it may be smooth  but …  I had a serious issue with 
regards to ordinary people whether it be members or an ordinary person that 
wants an assessment someone who wants to be assessed someone who wants 
a S289 a process where I feel that I am competent I want to be assessed and it’s 
                                                 
9 “The Section 28 Trade test (named after the relevant section in the Manpower Training Act) is a way of 
recognising the prior learning and experience of a person who has been working for some years in a 
particular trade but has not passed a trade test and is therefore not recognised as a qualified artisan.  
After the Applicant’s suitability for a trade test is determined, the Applicant will then undergo a trade test 
at a merSETA accredited trade test centre.” found at:  
http://www.merseta.org.za/SkillsDevelopment/LearningProgrammes/Section28.aspx   
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not up to my employer to decide that I'm ready. It’s me that I know I am ready but 
then you walk into merSETA, and you are told bring a letter from your employer.  
So that’s why I'm saying it’s not about administrative challenges in terms of 
meeting packs its other administrative challenges.  It’s almost like you’re saying 
that there are policies and procedures but they are very tight. They’re tight and 
rigid.    
 
Based on the review of the minutes of the Accounting Authority, the Exco, the Finance 
and Grants committee, the five chamber committees, and the IRD committee, in the 
main, the merSETA is seen to have implemented an environment enabling to 
stakeholders to perform their fiduciary duties.  Notification of meetings accompanied by 
minutes and decision lists are distributed to members within the time-frames stipulated 
by the various structures terms of reference.  This was confirmed by respondents SH08, 
SH03 and SHO7 respectively.  However, it would appear as though some stakeholder 
groups are confronted with challenges in ensuring that their members are prepared and 
capacitated to participate in meetings.   
 
The administrative efficiencies of the merSETA are well recognised and have 
contributed to their reputation of being one of the better performing SETAs.  However, 
the distinction between efficient administrative procedures and doing everything by the 
book was likened to being very tight and rigid.  Challenges experienced by some 
stakeholders included lack of resources including technology as impeding their ability to 
participate effectively. 
4.2.11 Stakeholder relations 
Most respondents echoed the following sentiment as articulated by respondent SH11:  
 I think it’s going well at the moment. I really, really do. I’ve been sitting on a 
number of these [merSETA structures].  The relations are good they very healthy 
you can see that nobody is hiding away from each other now because of ... at 
one stage you would have it that either unions wouldn’t talk out or employers 
wouldn’t talk out.  I think it’s come to a stage where merSETA has consistency 
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with our labour and employers can now speak negotiate without having this 
walking out of meetings. I really think we have come to this stage where I think 
it’s a really good relationship where they can debate issues.   
 
This sentiment was echoed by Respondent SH03 who added that even though there 
were times that “we don’t see eye to eye but I also think the structure is such that we 
are able to raise our concerns so in that sense the fact that the lines of communication 
are open is important and that helps to strengthen the relationships”.  Respondent SH04 
agreed that relations had improved extensively.  This respondent pointed out that 
previously it was deemed very important not to miss a meeting because “something 
would be approved something that you know that is very, very controversial or it’s kind 
of disturbing but we have come a long way such that we all are on the same page in 
terms of what is expected of us.  …Very, very, very united”.  
 
Another respondent commented that this was due to stakeholders on the Accounting 
Authority understanding their mandate.  
 
Notwithstanding the afore-mentioned, the fundamental challenge of the inherent conflict 
of interests which exists between labour and business emerged during the interviews 
and is aptly captured by Respondent SH08.  
 I think between labour and business they tolerate each other.  It’s nothing 
personal …  I was with them on Monday where we spent about an hour just 
listening to labour really driving an agenda about ... literally it was instead of 
monitoring expenditure against the project it was looking at the labour project.  
So we spent an hour doing that and you could see business getting agitated.  So 
it kind of gets very strained.   
 
Respondent SH01 succinctly described this as the stakeholders coming “with a different 
mind-set and of course there’s struggle.  I come out of the unions as do you and I 
believe that there is class struggle and I think people do have different perspectives on 
the same issue”.   
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A more candid view was put forward by Respondent SH07 who clarified that “it depends 
on who you are talking to. If you are talking to a stakeholder who believes that the 
merSETA is giving them sufficient funding yes”.  Adding that during the last 
Discretionary Grant window (DG5), old established relationships that had been there for 
years literally changed direction as a result of the over subscription of grant 
applications. 
 
Respondent SH13 was of the opinion that: “It’s not a very effective relationship.  …in 
fact we don’t even have an agreement with them yet on specific projects.   …I think we 
basically said it’s because we’re not paying levies so we are not the favoured client so 
to speak because we’re not contributing anything to them we’re asking them to do 
things for the economy and they ... we're sort of standing third or fourth in line compared 
to companies who are paying levies”. 
 
The inherent conflict of interest of the stakeholders is apparent in the divergent 
perceptions regarding stakeholder’s relations.  The most common sentiment expressed 
was that stakeholders had developed a better understanding of their mandate whilst 
simultaneously recognising their different interests.   
4.2.12 Impact of the learnership / apprenticeship system 
Most of the respondents were of the opinion that the merSETA has contributed large 
numbers of learnerships and apprenticeships exceeding targets with “people having 
been trained and certified”.  This sentiment was echoed by Respondent SH12 who 
commented, “They are producing a lot of artisans, which for me it then starts to say they 
are contributing positively not only in their sector but in the country as a whole”.  Four 
other respondents echoed this sentiment through citing the findings of an impact study 
which indicated that 80% of apprentices who had completed their apprenticeship 
programmes were employed indicating the success of the apprenticeship system.  This 
sentiment was corroborated by the Accounting Authority meeting held on the 25th 
November 2010 which noted that the merSETAs performance in the 2009/2010 score 
card had indicated merSETA at the lowest point as having surpassed other SETAs by 
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45 percent and at the highest point on SMME intervention by 2083 percent (merSETA 
min 2010b).   
 
The merSETAs over-performance is further corroborated in the 2012 NSF Progress 
Report.   
 
However, numerous concerns were raised regarding the impact of the training with two 
respondents expressing the view that having a qualification does not necessarily 
guarantee you a job and one qualifying that “the money that we are investing is not 
necessarily showing a return on the economy” (SH05). 
 
The increase of learners embarking upon training at NQF Levels 2 – 4 which culminates 
in a trade test was also viewed as having a positive impact.  Respondent SH03 was of 
the view that: “For our sector where employers are closely involved in that training the 
impact has been positive.  So the training is happening to industry standards the 
training is aligned to industry needs”.   This respondent expressed concern regarding 
the shift of funding to the public sector, believing that private sector training providers 
were providing the quality training that the industry required. 
 
A contrary view was expressed highlighting the fact that the quality of training was not 
always aligned with sector needs in that the majority of vulnerable workers who had 
received training had received two to three day training sessions in fire-fighting, forklift 
driving, and one day training sessions in HIV Aids and health and safety.  It was felt that 
this type of training does not provide them with qualifications in the event that they are 
retrenched (SH04).    
 
Upon examination of minutes of the Accounting Authority and the Finance and Grant 
committee a number of issues have emerged most notably with regard to the quality of 
training and the type of training that is being conducted. For example the Finance and 
Grants committee expressed concern regarding the progression of individual learners 
on trade related qualifications recognising that the bulk of learners were below the 
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National Qualifications Framework (NQF) level 1 (merSETA min 2012c).  The 3 sub-
frameworks that comprise the NQF are attached hereto as Appendix H.   
 
Concern was raised with regard to whether the merSETA was able to verify whether in 
fact training took place.  Stakeholders suggested that a developmental and monitoring 
component should be incorporated through which monitoring and evaluation could be 
introduced in order to verify company records and thereby prevent companies from 
importing a Workplace Skills Plan (WSP), reflecting that the training took place. The 
mechanism for compliance would be for both labour and business to sign off on the 
WSP.  The objectives of ensuring that training culminated in the development of skills 
and that it led to a qualification as well as ensuring progression was highlighted 
(merSETA min 2012d). 
 
Many respondents highlighted the absence of an effective learner tracking system as a 
challenge with Respondent (SH09) commenting that this remained one of the areas 
where the SETAs were lagging behind.   Respondent SH04 expressed strong 
reservations in this regard lamenting the fact that neither the merSETA staff nor the 
employers were able to verify whether training had in fact resulted in increased 
employment adding that, in the absence of verification, support for the SSP would be 
withheld.  
 
Respondent SH13 aptly summarised the conundrum of the “numbers versus quality” 
debate being underpinned by the perception of some employer’s scepticism regarding 
the AATP (Accelerated Artisan Training Programme).  This scepticism hinged on 
whether in fact this eighteen months training programme produced a good artisan.  
 
Reports reflecting that 57% of the budget was committed and that only 22% had been 
spent at mid-year, with the net effect that 19 of the 36 projects have zero spend against 
them when the first half of the year is already gone, was noted as being of utmost 
concern (merSETA min 2012e).  This data serves to cast doubt on the integrity of the 
performance and reporting framework as the merSETA has reported achieving average 
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performance ratings of 4.91 (out of a maximum of 5) on the scorecard with the DHET. It 
is especially concerning that targets which are geared towards assisting new entrants to 
participate in accredited work and new venture creation has not yielded much success 
as “not all jobs were sustained for 12 months and learners had therefore not started 
their own businesses”  (merSETA min, 2010c).   
 
The criteria for release of funds in respect of training appeared to be ambiguous with 
concern being raised about the statement that 60% of training reflected in the WSP is 
anticipated to be completed but that should in fact be 100%.  It was noted that if training 
did not take place the funds should not be released.  Stakeholders sought to reach a 
compromise between an 80/20 ratio instead of the 60/40 ratio of completed training 
noting that funding cannot be lost at such a rate10.  There was a view that a flexible and 
developmental approach needed to be adopted and not a punitive approach, as 
conditions in the workplace were not static and that it was affected by external factors. 
Therefore the target of 60% completion was deemed to be reasonable (merSETA min, 
2011f)11.   
 
The meeting of the Accounting Authority held on the 29th May 2012 corroborated the 
concern regarding the quality of training noting that the disbursement of Mandatory 
Grants remained the same and that Discretionary Grant disbursements improved but 
remained below budget as one of the reasons was that companies did not attain their 
milestones (merSETA min, 2012f). 
 
Likewise, concern was expressed in respect of continued training of apprentices when 
qualified artisans have not been placed and others are being retrenched. A concern was 
raised about the approved artisan development funding which does not necessarily 
ensure the placement of qualified artisans and that certain occupational requirements 
are not sufficiently supported.  Non-trade related skills programmes where people are 
progressing towards a qualification being one of them (merSETA min, 2012g).  
                                                 
10 Authors emphasis 
11 Authors emphasis 
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The meeting of the Accounting Authority held on the 27th November 2012 expressed 
concern at the high intake of unemployed learners as it was causing animosity amongst 
employees who feel they do not get an opportunity to become artisans (merSETA min, 
2012h). 
 
Concerns were raised regarding concurrent learnerships, which was not in compliance 
with SAQA requirements, which stipulates that an incumbent may only be registered on 
one learnership at a time.  The absence of a learner tracking mechanism was identified 
with a resolution being taken to implement a system in order to determine the reasons 
for withdrawals (merSETA min, 2012d). 
 
Time lags between the signing of Memoranda of Agreements (MOAs) (which were 
supposed to be signed within 3 months of being issued) resulted in training not 
commencing as companies had not received funding.  Interestingly, there appeared to 
be uncertainty regarding how much funding had been committed and how much was 
available (merSETA min, 2011e). 
 
Ambiguity with regard to available funding is illustrated in the discussion at the Finance 
and Grants committee held on the 19th November 2012 whereby it was noted that  
R230 million was available in the budget for DG funding at the last meeting which 
prompted a special meeting to address the DG criteria to ensure allocation of 
funds only to learn at the present meeting that DG4 was over committed resulting 
in the dilemma of having to decide whether to continue opening the window with 
the limited funds or whether to advise employers that there is no money available 
for allocation (merSETA min, 2012i).   
 
Concerns regarding alignment of the Strategic Plan and the Annual SLA with the 
budgets are corroborated in the discussion held at the Finance and Grants Meeting 
where it was noted that a number of the listed projects are dormant and that thirteen 
projects will end at the end of the financial year.  In response to the concern which was 
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raised about the seemingly slow movement of certain projects on the report, it was 
noted that management had agreed to halt and put on hold certain projects in the light 
of the increasing concern about funding, and that there had been a slowdown in respect 
of the tender processes where commitments have not been made despite budgets 
having been approved.  It was reported that management had advised that the current 
budgeting process was under review given the concern that it could be creating 
problems and that a better budgeting mechanism would be implemented to address the 
concerns (merSETA min, 2013a).   
 
It is of grave concern that the Accounting Authority approved the grant guidelines at 
their meeting of the 22nd February 2012, despite the fact that it was recognised that …”if 
the Board approves the criteria as a generic guideline and leaves the office to direct 
disbursement the same situation may present itself this year with an over subscription 
against the available grants in the next year” (merSETA min, 2012j). 
 
The fundamental challenge, however, is the numbers versus quality concern which is 
exacerbated by the fact that the data management system lacks credibility given the 
challenges with the implementation of the MIS system.  In addition, there is a perception 
from some stakeholders that there was no political will to understand the mandate of 
NSDSIII, which was geared towards training for self-employment and sustainable 
livelihoods, SMEs, NGOs, NPOs and cooperatives and not just about training for 
production.  
4.2.13 Advice to merSETA 
Respondent SH08 expressed a sentiment shared by many of the respondents through 
the following comment:   
 I wish I could advise the Department more than anyone …  but … in advising 
merSETA, it would be currently to contain itself,  not grow, in other words the 
staff base must not grow, it must actually shrink, in light of the expenditure cap 
and all the other demands,  the financial demands the Department is making. 
...because we’ve already seen where we going, the Department has made it 
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clear in not so many words that the number of SETAs that will be required is 
much less [maybe] about three or four. 
 
Two respondents were of the firm opinion that there were just too many SETAs, noting 
the fragmented approach towards skills development and training which generally 
existed within South Africa.  One respondent was of the view that we either get a single 
system that drives it or we reduce the number of SETAs (SH10). 
 
Respondents believed that as the merSETA had ‘the Ministers ear’ that they should be 
more proactive and more particularly engage the Minister in respect of the phenomena 
of ’mission creep’.  Respondent SH02 was of the view that: 
the Minister should have been told a long time ago if my levy income is X but you 
expect me to do Y and I can show you that we don’t have surpluses it is just not 
good business.  We’re budgeting for a deficit and to expect us to make good by 
forming partnerships and say that we will bring other people to the party to make 
it financially work. I don’t think that’s good business.  
 
Prioritisation and reconfiguring projects was identified as another major challenge, with 
Respondent SH03 arguing that there was a need for refocusing of priorities, 
reconfiguring some projects and directing spending towards industry needs. This 
respondent also echoed the concern raised with regard to administration, highlighting 
the frustration that the administrative burden of the merSETA is too high and 
questioning whether there were ways to streamline the system. Up skilling staff was 
identified as another challenge with research and analytical skills identified as being 
lacking.  This respondent also highlighted the need for participatory and transparent 
decision-making.   
 
Respondent SH09 emphasised the importance of assessing performance and a learner 
tracking system. Conducting qualitative performance assessments to obtain information 
pertaining to the number of graduates who had secured employment was deemed to be 
necessary as it was felt that the focus had been on obtaining unqualified audits (SH09). 
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This respondent succinctly captured the widely held concern regarding the tension 
between the achievement of targets and compliance and performance, highlighting that 
obtaining a clean audit did not equate to good performance in achieving the pre-
determined objectives. Systemic challenges including information and communication 
flows internally and externally as well as on-going capacity building of stakeholders 
were identified as challenges. Branding was suggested as an important strategy given 
the: 
perception that the SETAs do not deliver is because they may be delivering but 
they’re delivering in such an underground kind of way.  Nobody knows them.  
There are no brands that are connected to the SETAs.  The only brand that’s 
connected to them is their name but they don’t stand out for a particular type of 
programme (SH13). 
 
Respondent SH01 proffered a widely held view of not doing away with the SETAs as 
they were an asset to the education and training institutional system.  The SETAs were 
viewed as providing an access point into the labour market.  This respondent was of the 
opinion that the SETAs were a “fabulous vehicle   …so I would be thinking first of all 
let’s stop hammering SETAs let’s celebrate the fact that we’ve got something that 
frankly other countries envy.  We’ve got an institution and we’ve got a levy system that 
holds it together and let’s build it so don’t fragment it“. 
 
The advices provided ranged from reducing the number of SETAs from 21 to either 3 or 
4 or to one single skills development entity.  Various systemic challenges were identified 
as requiring attention, including performance monitoring and evaluation, information and 
communication systems, and capacity building of stakeholders including staff.  
Refocusing and prioritising projects was identified as another key challenge having 
taken cognisance that there were too many projects. 
 
Transformation imperatives remained the elephant in the room, within the context of a 
shrinking funding base and the oft-cited ’mission creep’.  This tension manifests in 
almost every aspect of the operationalising of the NSDSIII mandate most notably with 
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regard to non-core targets such as support to CBOs, NGOs, SMMEs, ABET and rural 
development.   
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5. DISCUSSION  
 
This chapter discusses the findings presented in Chapter Four under the themes of 
governance and institutional arrangements.  The discussion draws primarily on the 
perceptions of the merSETA stakeholders on whether effective governance exists within 
the merSETA to deliver on their core mandate of skills development as well as the 
challenges that impacts on the delivery of the learnerships and apprenticeship system. 
 
It became evident during this research process that the success of the skills 
development system cannot be discussed in isolation from the dominant discourse on 
Human Capital Theory in the country.  This discourse holds that an increase in the up-
skilling of the workforce leads to an increase in employment and ultimately to an 
increase in economic growth.  Human Capital Theory which is deemed to be the 
dominant discourse underpinning the Human Resources Development Strategy in 
South Africa, influences the outcomes of interventions such as the NSDSIII.  Vally and 
Motala (2014), amongst others, are advocating for a paradigm shift for policymakers 
and practitioners in the skills development arena.  They argue that the manner in which 
the skills gap has been framed completely advantages capital in that expanding the pool 
of skills does not lead to job creation; it leads to lower wages because employers have 
even more skilled, unemployed people to choose from – and they get the government to 
pay for it (Vally & Motala, 2014).  
 
The author notes the distinction between corporate governance and systemic 
governance advanced by the Singizi report. Notions of corporate governance have its 
genesis in the development of the King Codes which largely considers governance 
practices from a market-based perspective. It was therefore deemed appropriate to use 
the definition proffered by Leftwich (2005) in respect of institutional arrangements 
constituting a component of governance as the framework for examining the 
perceptions of the stakeholders of the institution in a more holistic manner.   
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The format for this discussion is framed with governance being the overarching concept 
which is defined as: 
the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels.  It comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (p. 12) 
(Grindle, 2007, p. 556). 
 
Institutional arrangements comprising of the stakeholders, their capacity, roles and 
responsibilities including relationships as well as the composition of structures, 
principals, conflict of interests and decision making are the categories which were used 
to understand the stakeholders’ perceptions of the nature of governance within the 
merSETA.  Adherence to policy, procedures, communication and information which are 
deemed as enablers for the stakeholders to carry out their fiduciary responsibility were 
additional mechanisms used to understand the nature of governance within the 
merSETA. 
5.1 Governance within the merSETA  
The stakeholders view effective governance as being compliant with King III, the PFMA 
and other related statutes. This is demonstrated through the fact that the merSETA has 
established a governance unit which is responsible for all the governance functions of 
the merSETA ensuring that the merSETA complies with the King Code III as well as 
with the PFMA and other related statutes. 
 
The merSETA in the main is considered to be in compliance with their fiduciary 
responsibilities in that they have succeeded in receiving unqualified audit reports since 
the establishment of the SETAs.  The merSETA disclosed that they had suffered a 
number of instances of fraud committed by staff members in their annual reports for 
2012 and 2013.  The merSETA appeared to be have dealt with these transgressions 
speedily through seeking recourse in the courts.  Meting out sanctions to those who 
have seriously transgressed ethical practice is considered key to building a culture and 
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practice of good governance within organisations.  It also demonstrates adherence to 
good governance practices through the leadership exercising their responsibility and 
holding officials tasked with the delivery of public goods and services accountable.  
 
The remuneration of stakeholder representatives for attendance at meetings could 
potentially become the SETAs Achilles’ heel as it is potentially open to abuse.  It would 
appear as though the merSETA has implemented this policy directive without having 
instituted the requisite accountability mechanisms.  This system is potentially open to 
abuse in the absence of robust accountability mechanisms. 
5.2 Institutional arrangements within the merSETA  
Stakeholders’ perceptions with regard to the effectiveness of the institutional 
arrangements in the merSETA vary. This could be attributed to various factors such as 
the absence of a shared understanding of governance as well as the absence of a 
shared understanding of the mandate of the SETA.  The following quotes demonstrate 
the different understanding of governance within the merSETA. 
 
One respondent defined governance as:   
Good governance for me would be how do we spend the money and can we 
account for it and if there are any other issues such as communication on what’s 
happening in the organisation what’s happening nationally it’s shared there the 
whole issue of transparency and the issue of accountability (SH10).   
 
This definition is aligned with the broader definition of the UNDP.   
 
Another respondent defined good governance as  
A SETA should have the systems the processes policies financial control 
measures the structures sub-committees functioning within the SETA (SH03.)  
 
This definition is aligned with the narrow definition as espoused by Leftwich. 
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Additional contributing factors impeding adherence to good governance according to the 
perceptions of the stakeholders, were other institutional challenges such as having ’too 
many masters to please’, ’mission creep’, conflict of interest between stakeholders, and 
what appears to be an inefficient decision making system. 
 
Stakeholders are of the view that the major factor which serves to impede the 
Accounting Authority in carrying out their fiduciary duties is the ‘too many masters to 
please’ phenomena. This manifests in the fact that the Accounting Authority does not 
have full control of decisions pertaining to the core mandate of the merSETA.  This is 
evident in the actions of the DHET (in their capacity of Executive Authority) having 
unilaterally increased targets agreed to in the SLA with the merSETA.  National 
Treasury to whom the SETAs are accountable in terms of the PFMA had also recently 
decided to cap the amount of money to be utilised for administration costs, from 10% to 
7.5%.  SETAs are in the untenable position where they are held accountable for 
meeting targets within pre-determined budgets which are unilaterally changed by their 
principals. In addition the perceptions exists that there is no political will on the part of 
some stakeholders to understand the mandate of NSDSIII, which amongst others is 
geared towards training for self employment and sustainable livelihoods, SMEs, NGOs, 
NPOs and cooperatives and not just about training for production. In the main this has 
manifested as tension between delivering on the South African government’s broader 
political mandate where they [the SETAs] are expected to address transformation 
imperatives as opposed to the core mandate of skills development of the SETAs.  Not 
having full control of their budgets has had a seriously adverse effect on their business 
and strategic planning processes and service delivery.  This is an unfortunate clash 
between the political mandate, other regulatory imperatives and the SETA mandate.   
 
It would appear as though there is an absence of a shared understanding of 
stakeholders.  None of the respondents either identified or included the beneficiaries of 
the skills development system as stakeholders.  NUMSA represents workers in the 
metal and engineering sectors.  The skills development system however also targets 
unemployed workers.  In addition the composition of the merSETA Accounting Authority 
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indicates that there are no government representatives on the board despite the fact 
that the merSETA is in the centre of all the economic cluster departments.  It is also 
telling that the Auto Chamber meeting held on the 28th September 2010 decided to 
delete the discussion requiring two members from the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Department of Science and Technology as representatives on the 
chamber committee as it is not a prerequisite (merSETA, 2010f).  This is in stark 
contrast to the recognition by the stakeholders that the SSP process should be 
extended to include other government departments as their policies may impact on the 
merSETA, more particularly as there is acknowledgement that the SSP is not aligned 
with the needs of the sector. 
 
NSDSIII which sets out the targets for the period 1st April 2011 to 31st March 2016 is 
viewed as being too broad in its scale and scope according to the stakeholders.  SETAs 
are faced with having to make a trade-off between embracing the transformative 
imperatives of the socio-economic mandate contained in the NSDSIII, against the 
increasingly shrinking pool of resources earmarked for skills development.  The 
continued training of apprentices when qualified artisans have not been placed and 
others are being retrenched is indicative of the disjuncture between the identified 
demand and supply of skills. 
 
This tension [between trade-offs] surfaces during meetings of the merSETA structures 
according to stakeholders and becomes evident during discussions on the allocation of 
resources.  Stakeholders hold the view that this heightens the chasm of the different 
interests of the stakeholders which has emerged as another major challenge negatively 
impacting on governance.   Numerous examples were cited with both the labour 
representatives and business seen to be driving their own agenda.  The most notable 
example provided by the stakeholders was the compromise of the 60/40 ratio 
completion rate (deemed to constitute an effective training outcome) with the underlying 
motivation being that companies did not possess the capacity to deliver on 100% 
training completion rates.  These practices illustrate the bargaining council posturing 
which stakeholders have adopted.   
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Decision making pertaining to targets such as the Retrenchment Assistance 
Programme as well as learnership interventions for the unemployed verses the 
employed was another example of the stakeholders’ perceptions of the inherent conflict 
of interests within the merSETA.  Likewise there exists a perception that organised 
business is not supportive of the NSDSIII transformation targets and considers the levy 
grant system as an additional unwarranted tax burden.  
 
Examining the relationships between the various stakeholders indicated that even 
though there was a widely held perception that relationships had improved, the 
observation of the modus operandi gleaned from the interviews and corroborated by the 
examination of the minutes of the various sub-structures of the merSETA tends to 
negate the perception of an improvement in stakeholder relationships.   It is 
questionable whether the mistrust had been eliminated, which one respondent 
illustrated in the example of stakeholders being apprehensive of missing a meeting as 
controversial decisions could be taken in their absence.   
 
The examination of the minutes demonstrates the view of stakeholders that decision 
making can be cumbersome and drawn out.  In this regard tracking the decision making 
process with regard to the MIS and other examples illustrated in Chapter Four of this 
report is indicative of what Bachrach and Baratz (cited in Ham & Hill, 1993) has referred 
to as non-decision making through the practice of escalating decisions within an 
organisation, as well as referring decisions for further deliberation and investigation to 
special task teams or committees.   
 
This practice could also be likened to individuals and elites either acting in concert or at 
times even failing to act at all in order to keep unacceptable decisions out of the 
organisations politics and in so doing preventing the system from becoming any more 
diverse than it is (Ham & Hill, 1993). The implication of this is that these practices are 
exhibiting elements of latent decisive indecisiveness which has been likened to an art 
form for political survival by never making any enemies. In addition if no one takes any 
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decisions when confronted with difficult choices, then no one can be held responsible 
for the inevitable consequences of fall outs.  No one loses face.  This is the underlying 
governing principle for most non-decisions. 
 
It is unclear whether stakeholders were aware of their concomitant responsibility for non 
decision making in the example of the MIS.  There was no evidence on who was 
ultimately held responsible for managing the contract with the service provider 
commissioned to provide and implement the MIS.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the expenditure on the MIS was in excess of a few million Rands.  The role of executive 
management (Manco) is unclear creating the perception of a blurring of roles and 
responsibilities. There appeared to be some confusion between the stakeholders role of 
providing strategic support and oversight (the responsibility of the Accounting Authority) 
with that of direct intervention in the operational affairs of the merSETA (the 
responsibility of the Manco).  
 
The power and responsibility of the CEO to lead and intervene at a strategic level is 
impeded given his de facto limitations in this role as evidenced in the fact that the 
constitution stipulates that the CEO may be invited to meetings of the Accounting 
Authority and Executive Committee meetings.  This view is corroborated in the MTT 
report (DHET, 2013). 
  
The examination of the minutes of the various structures corroborates the perception of 
the stakeholders regarding blurring of responsibilities. For example, the same members 
who are represented on the Accounting Authority are also represented on the sub-
structures of the merSETA.  The roles and responsibilities of these different structures 
vary from oversight to that of representing constituent’s interests on structures (such as 
the chamber committees) tasked with the responsibility for the development of strategic 
input of the SSP.  These conflicting roles and responsibilities can lead to a culture of 
abdication of responsibility with dire consequences for the organisation. 
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The stakeholders’ perceptions with regard to the capacity of stakeholder representatives 
to engage meaningfully on the various structures are that stakeholder’s capacity is 
diverse and in some instances is lacking.  This is exacerbated by the fact that there 
appears to be various degrees of capacity between the stakeholder constituencies.  The 
labour delegates, more especially those from the shop floor experience challenges in 
ensuring their preparedness for meetings at structures such as the chamber 
committees.  The challenge of maintaining institutional memory further contributes to 
capacity gaps by virtue of the fact that worker leaders are elected re-elected or not 
elected at all at four yearly intervals in accordance with democratic mechanisms within 
the trade union structures. These factors resonate with the concern raised by the MTT 
report that one of the more significant challenges in the present governance policy 
provisions is the fact that the complex and serious nature of the responsibilities of board 
members do not reconcile well with the part-time nature of their tenure and casual 
nature of practice (DHET, 2013).   
 
Stakeholders’ perceptions indicate that there is no evidence of collaboration between 
the different stakeholders and whether it had facilitated problem solving and reflection of 
changes to effect policy change.  Most notably this is evident in the fact that the 
merSETA was unable to present a united and coherent response to the Minister of the 
DHET during the process that culminated in the reduction of the mandatory grants from 
45% to 20%, nor in the National Treasury’s decision to cap administration at 7.5%.  
Both of these interventions have adversely affected the SETAs with regard to the 
amount of funds available for training as well as operational costs including staffing.  It 
is also unclear whether mandated representatives had diffused learning into their 
constituent organisations.   
 
For the exception of the view expressing the concerns of staff regarding their job 
security, the stakeholders were of the view that it appeared as though not all the 
stakeholders embraced the restructuring process.  Executive management led the 
process but did not highlight any of the institutional changes (if any) leading to the 
perception that this process was primarily championed by a particular group of 
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stakeholders.  It did not appear as though any significant institutional changes had 
occurred as a result of the restructuring process.  Neither does it appear as though 
lessons had been derived as demonstrated in the examples of non-decision making 
processes (in Chapter Four) in terms of building consensus. 
 
Despite having adopted the Batho Pele (People First) Principles, some merSETA 
stakeholders continue to hold the perception that these principles have not been wholly 
assimilated into its culture. In fact, as can be gleaned from the data, representatives of 
the beneficiaries of the learnership and apprenticeship programs had lamented the 
bureaucratic practices in the merSETA.  
 
In the main the merSETA is seen as having an efficient administrative system but there 
is painfully little which is demonstrated in the service standard in respect of the actual 
quality of the ’products’ [learnerships / apprenticeship] being consumed. Stakeholders 
perceive this efficient administrative system as masking the institutional and governance 
challenges which continue to impede the merSETA in delivering on its mandate. This 
efficient administrative system could also be likened to an institution which contains 
remnants of service delivery aimed at ’customer satisfaction’ as opposed to an 
institution with an embedded, developmental orientation. 
 
Stakeholders hold the view that the performance management system relating to most 
of the merSETA targets appears to lack reliability.  In this regard it is instructive to note 
the over performance of the merSETA across almost all of its targets as evidenced in 
the performance information for the period 2012 / 2013.  Stakeholders are of the view 
that a reliable mechanism to validate and verify how many learners are on concurrent 
learnerships does not exist.  The reported over achievement of targets by 2083% in 
respect of SMME intervention indicates that the system requires interrogation given the 
report that not all jobs (in respect of this target) were sustained for 12 months and that 
learners had therefore not started their own businesses. 
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There does not appear to be a reliable mechanism to validate and verify the quality of 
training as demonstrated in the decision to accept a 60/40 ratio of training as being 
complete.  The views of the stakeholders imply that a common and shared 
understanding of the quality of training and whether it is aligned with industry needs 
does not exist.  This is evidenced in the demands by stakeholders for validation of the 
numbers of learners who have been placed in employment. This is also evident in the 
fact that employers have expressed scepticism of whether an eighteen month 
learnership programme produced a qualified artisan.  The system is potentially open to 
occurrences of double counting.  Respondents indicated that an overlap exists with the 
old data-net system and the new MIS with stakeholders expressing the view that there 
is no reliable learner tracking system.  The stakeholders perceive the latter as 
amplifying the weaknesses rooted in the management information system. 
 
Numerous gaps have been identified in the project planning and budgeting process.  
This includes non-alignment between the Strategic Plan, the SLA and budgets.  It is 
unclear whether targeted interventions and financial input data are robust given the 
concerns regarding its integrity by amongst others the Finance and Grants committee of 
the merSETA.  This is demonstrated in the over subscription of the DG512 window as 
well as the special meeting convened to discuss the availability of funds. 
 
It is important that a holistic approach to institutional change is advanced.  This should 
recognise that obtaining good governance can only be attained when, amongst others, 
institutional weaknesses such as flawed decision making processes, contestation over 
resources and diffused responsibility are addressed in tandem.  The need for a holistic 
capacity building intervention which encompasses capacity building of the stakeholders 
as well as the organisation is required to ensure that an enabling environment is created 
where stakeholders can drive and manage their own sustainable development (Bird & 
Heitmann, 2009). 
 
                                                 
12 The firth annual call for applications for discretionary grants 
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Stakeholders expressed the view that the fundamental question which is emerging is 
whether the merSETA has the requisite capacity to deliver on its mandate given their 
[the stakeholders] perceptions of what appears to be a dysfunctional planning and 
reporting, and monitoring and evaluation framework underpinning a levy grant system in 
excess of R1 billion annually.  
 
In conclusion, the author recognises that the merSETA operates in an intricate political 
environment alongside a complex institutional design with its multiple principles and its 
diffused accountability and responsibility mechanisms. It is therefore suggested that the 
good governance agenda should encompass a more nuanced understanding of the 
evolution of institutions. The perceptions of the stakeholders indicate that the 
aforementioned complexities together collude in impeding the merSETA from delivering 
on its mandate on learnerships and apprenticeships. 
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6. CONCLUSION  
 
The hybrid nature of the SETA entities given the complex political environment and the 
complexity of the structure, composition of the stakeholders, multiple principals, diffused 
reporting lines and accounting mechanisms has created a very complicated institution.  
The practice of part time Accounting Authority members who are accountable to various 
government line departments and whose members devolve power and responsibility via 
delegation of authority to Executive management could serve to undermine public 
accountability.  Such an environment can inadvertently lead to what Stone refers to as 
the practice of the stakeholders being ‘intrinsically less responsive to the political 
preferences of their political masters and publics” (Stone, 2008). 
 
The diverse ideological perspectives of the stakeholders translate into instances of non-
decision making as demonstrated by the absence of a coherent strategy to engage the 
DHET with regard to the oft cited mission creep.  
 
Respondents’ contradictory responses to the prevalence of conflict of interests 
juxtaposed with their responses to stakeholder relationships, is instructive.  It 
demonstrates the consequences of the bargaining council like modus operandi of the 
institution which culminates in decision making on ’safe’ issues.  This is demonstrated in 
the stakeholder’s inability to reach consensus on a training quality standard and their 
subsequent decision to accept a 60/40 ratio as a standard to measure the quality of 
training.  
 
The lack of senior industry players participating in the SETAs is a major institutional 
challenge.  This manifests in the fact that there are no representatives from 
Government’s economic cluster on the merSETA Accounting Authority, which has 
contributed to the absence of synergy and alignment of the merSETA SSP with national 
sector development plans such as the National Growth Path, National Development 
Plan and Industrial Policy Action Plan. This implies that asymmetrical strategic 
information coupled with the limited capacity of stakeholders to engage, network, and 
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advocate at high levels of industry impedes their ability to influence their sectors’ 
imperatives at a national level.  The jury is out on what interventions, if at all, are 
possible in influencing the envisaged DHET led re-engineering of the Skills 
development architecture with respect to either reducing the number of SETAs to three 
or four, or to a single Skills Development entity.  It is questionable to what extent the 
CEO is able to lead and intervene at a strategic level given his de facto limitations in this 
role. 
 
Despite the fact that there may be a clear understanding of the legislation regarding the 
roles and responsibilities of the Accounting Authority and the Executive Management 
there still exists a blurring of roles and responsibilities.  Practically there appears to be 
different expectations with the Accounting Authority deferring responsibility to Executive 
Management and Executive Management expecting the Accounting Authority to take 
lead responsibility for certain interventions such as engagement with the DHET.  
 
The inherent conflict of interests of the stakeholders necessitates more collaborative 
engagements between them in order to achieve goals related to policy implementation 
and service delivery.  This requires a paradigm shift of the stakeholders in that they 
should recognise that political processes cannot be short-circuited through technical 
and analytical approaches only. 
 
The capacity of stakeholders to effectively participate within various merSETA fora, 
needs to be reviewed in the light of the same individual’s representation on almost all of 
the structures.  In addition, the policy of remunerating stakeholders without the 
concomitant robust accountability mechanisms, may lead to gate-keeping.  
 
Given the fact that it is difficult to verify and validate the number of learner enrolments 
and achievements it is imperative that the reporting framework is reviewed and 
analysed as instances of double counting of learners on concurrent learnerships / skills 
programmes may be occurring.  The systemic challenges faced with the migration from 
datanet to the SMS system needs to be addressed in order to enhance the integrity of 
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the performance monitoring, evaluation and reporting system to ensure that formally 
defined institutional mechanisms exists for assessing the impact of training, (given the 
unacceptable low consensual 60/40 completion training ratio).  
 
The mandate of the SETAs is too broad and not clearly understood given the various 
directives emanating from the DHET.  Secondly, there was a lack of understanding of 
the SETA mandate as well as a lack of political will from some stakeholders to 
understand the objectives of NSDSIII. This is one of the major factors impeding the 
ability of the merSETA to deliver on its mandate.    
 
Similarly, the ability of the merSETA to develop an approach in relation to governments 
objective of redressing the legacy of the past through its national imperatives such as 
ABET provision, skills required as part of poverty alleviation programmes, or those that 
relate to rural development programmes, presents a further impediment.  There is a 
need for the merSETA to develop an approach in relation to other campaigns and 
programmes in these areas with a view to establishing clearly defined partnerships and 
collaboration.   
 
The re-establishment of the SETAs on a 5 yearly basis effectively prevents the 
development of a long term vision of skills development aligned with national economic 
development goals contained within the National Development Plan and the National 
Growth Path.  
 
Given the hybrid nature of the merSETA, and its institutional characteristics of pockets 
of excellence, such as an efficient administrative system, it is recognised that the 
organisation will continue to evolve and change over time.  This will largely be 
dependent upon the organisation and its stakeholders demonstrating responsiveness to 
various stimuli such as internal as well as external threats.  It also requires that 
cognisance is taken of the limitations of the existing institutional arrangements. 
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Addressing the limitations of the existing institutional arrangements requires change.  It 
is recognised that such change will not be devoid of resistance from competing interests 
groups who will naturally be threatened by the development of new sets of institutional 
arrangements.  There also exists the potential that these competing interest groups may 
also be torn between compliance with the existing formal institutional requirements and 
the demands of informal institutional loyalties in the discharge of their duties (Leftwich, 
2007). 
 
Finally, good governance, according to Leftwich (1994), in its limited current conception 
is not likely to generate much development on its own.  It requires the politics and 
authority of the state to maintain it, as neither sophisticated institutional innovations nor 
a highly trained and capacitated bureaucracy will be able to withstand the disdainful 
consequences of corrupt practices gnawing away at a weakening developmental 
agenda for their own interests. He cautions that it is the ultimate ’technicist error’ to 
expect that uncompromising conditionality’s will culminate in good governance and 
ultimately development, without recognising that political change has to occur (Leftwich, 
1994, p. 381). 
 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the merSETA adopts a good governance agenda, 
encompassing the basic fundamental pre-requisites of democracy, (i.e. transparency, 
effective and efficient decision making, participation and accountability).  More formal 
research underpinning decision making is required.  This would enhance the 
dissemination and learning to a wider community given the fact that the merSETA 
constituent representatives feed back into fairly strong organisations like NUMSA and 
SEIFSA.  In addition the ethical compliance with statutory rules and procedures, 
underpinned by a learning organisation (committed to a holistic capacity building 
programme) could provide the impetus for the merSETA to deliver on its mandate.   
 
The debate about skills development which is a key determinate of a more equitable 
society usually takes the form of an argument of resources and/or profits.  The larger 
economic question demands a political environment where government adopts an 
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economic model that would actually realise full employment in conjunction with the 
socio economic rights enshrined in the bill of rights within the constitution. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are suggested to the merSETA.   
 
7.1 That the SETA Accounting Authorities should comprise of independent sector 
experts, with the concomitant responsibility and accountability for developing and 
managing the business plans of the organisation (including budgets), which are 
aligned with sectoral and national imperatives such as the NDP, NGP and IPAP.  
The appointment of Independent sector experts will enhance collegiality and 
minimise the prevailing conflict of interests, given that existing board members 
are both principals as well as beneficiaries. 
 
7.2 That the advisory nature, composition and reporting lines of the chamber 
committees be reviewed. 
 
7.3 That the monthly meetings of the Exco be reviewed to incorporate Executive 
Management.  
 
7.4 That structures such as the Manco and QMR, as well as the outcomes of 
strategic planning sessions and ad hoc task teams be incorporated formally into 
the merSETA structures to ensure follow through of agenda items which are 
either referred and/or deferred.  
 
7.5 That the merSETA develops an organogram which clearly depicts the structural 
arrangements in respect of decision making and accountability of the various 
structures internally and externally. 
 
7.6 That submissions are submitted and dialogue initiated with the DHET in regard to 
the role of the CEO on the Governing Board and Exco.  
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7.7 That the scope and scale of the SETAs mandate urgently needs to be addressed 
as the current 19 outcomes and 39 outputs, cover the gambit of socio-economic-
political indicators, which are not necessarily the DHETs core mandate, i.e. Abet 
training, SMME development and skills development for NGOs and CBOs, and 
rural development. 
 
7.8 That the merSETA distinguishes its core mandate and strategic objectives from 
that of the non-core mandates in order to prioritise sector specific interventions. 
 
7.9 That the merSETA commissions an external impact study on NSDSIII targets as 
well as the project planning and implementation process (with an emphasis on 
reviewing the project cycle in terms of timeframes from conceptualisation to 
implementation; risk management to include analyses of capacity of training 
providers; a cost benefit analysis of training outcomes; as well as an interrogation 
of the existing reporting framework particularly in respect of reporting on 
concurrent learnerships / skills programmes).   
 
7.10 That the Minister of the DHET be lobbied to pronounce on the long term vision of 
the SETA landscape in respect of the number of SETAs that will be retained, as 
well as a review of the current 5 year (re)establishment of the SETAs.  It is 
envisaged that these certainties will contribute to the streamlining of systemic 
challenges such as the performance and reporting framework requirements to 
both the DHET and the SAQA will be enhanced, 
 
7.11 That the policy of remuneration of stakeholders needs to be reviewed to include 
robust accountability measures. 
 
7.12 Development of succession plans for the labour representatives to ensure that 
institutional memory is maintained in the event of stakeholders retiring, resigning 
and/or being recalled by their respective constituencies. 
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7.13 Development of a holistic capacity building programme for stakeholders and the 
organisation should be undertaken.  
 
7.14 Review of the current annual process of Governing Board and sub-committee 
assessments of structures to include analyses and recommendations and 
implementation plans. 
 
7.15 An evaluation of the SMS system including a cost benefit analysis to ascertain 
the viability of the system should be undertaken.  Review of the contract with the 
service provider to identify whether an exit clause exists and whether funds can 
be recovered for services not delivered in accordance with the contract.  
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APPENDICES  
A. Definitions and procedures:  Mandatory and Discretionary Grants 
Mandatory Grants  
Mandatory grants must be paid by the SETA if the company fulfills the requirements to 
receive Mandatory Grants. 
 
The 30 June deadline applies for Mandatory grants to employers who submit the 
Workplace Skills Plan in terms of the specified requirements.  Late submissions do not 
qualify for the grant. 
 
This grant is 50% of the total skills levy paid by the employer over a year in monthly 
contributions of 1% of its payroll.  In order to benefit from this grant employers are 
required to submit the Workplace Skills Plan (WSP) with the Annual Training Report 
(ATR) from the previous year. 
 
Employers who submit the WSP / ATR also qualify for the additional Discretionary 
Grants to fund training. 
 
Skills development should be a continuous, planned and structured process that is 
influenced by the SETA requirements, but not dependent on them.   
 
The skills planning process should include: 
A skills audit (about every 3 to 5 years) to determine the current state of skills in the 
company, followed by, 
An annual training needs analysis to identify the main skills gaps and training needs that 
must be addressed to improve the organisation’s performance, resulting in: 
A comprehensive training and development plan for learning and other skills 
development programmes to improve employee and organizational performance.  This 
document should be used as a basis for compiling the WSP/ATR. 
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There is a common misconception that the Mandatory Grant is only paid if the WSP 
includes programmes that will lead to credits on the National Qualifications Framework 
(NQF). This is not true. The Skills Levy Regulations mandate SETAs to pay the grant to 
employers who submit the WSP/ATR in the specified format by 30 June. 
 
The WSP/ATR templates provided by the SETAs make provision for employers to 
indicate which programmes are aligned to the NQF or registered with the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA). 
 
The skills planning process should be driven by the internal or external person 
designated as Skills Development Facilitator (SDF). This is generally someone from the 
Human Resource Development or Training and Development unit in a company, or the 
person responsible for staff training. 
Discretionary Grants  
Discretionary grants are developed and paid out at the discretion of the SETA 
Management and the Board. 
 
Source:  Hatting, S. (2010) Time to get serious about the WSP.  Retrieved 12/10/2014 
from http://www.skillsportal.co.za/page/skills-development/suzanne-
hattingh/476922-Time-to-get-serious-about-the-WSP 
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B. Interview Schedule 
  
Name Respondent code allocated 
by researcher 
merSETA official  SHO8 
merSETA official SH05 
merSETA official SH06 
merSETA official SH11 
merSETA stakeholder SH03 
DHET official SH09 
DHET official SH12 
merSETA official SH07 
merSETA official SH02 
merSETA stakeholder SH04 
DHET official SH01 
merSETA official SH10 
merSETA stakeholder SH13 
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C. merSETA Performance Information 
 
Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
 
4.1 
Programme 1: 
Administration 
 
Best practice effected in line with King III 
 
All merSETA 
projects and 
processes are 
audited internally 
and externally, use 
of the fraud hotline is 
encouraged and 
sustainable 
practices are 
initiated and 
implemented. 
Board performance 
is externally 
assessed. 
 
 
All performance and 
financial 
information has been 
audited 
throughout all four quarters 
of 
2012/13. An energy audit 
has been conducted and 
consciousness around 
responsible use of water, 
energy, paper and disposal 
of various materials has 
been developed through 
various awareness 
interventions. Batho Pele 
values have been 
introduced and 
Accounting Authority 
assessments have been 
carried out. 
 
merSETA resources aligned to effectively execute 
the strategy 
 
Organisational 
structure is 
reviewed; leaner and 
smarter operations 
are implemented 
and encouraged 
throughout the 
organisation. 
 
Organisational renewal 
was carried out and 
finalised in September 
2012. Review of this 
exercise took place in 
March 2013. Internship 
programme has been 
formalised and monitoring 
system in place. Cost-
cutting measures have 
been implemented 
organisation-wide 
including restrictions on 
travel 
and accommodation and 
planned 
introduction of video-
conferencing 
facilities. 
 
Compliance with all relevant legislation and 
regulations 
 
Legal compliance 
register is developed 
and maintained. 
 
Legal compliance register 
was 
developed and discussed 
in quarterly monitoring 
review meetings. 
 
Customer/stakeholder expectations met or 
exceeded 
 
Stakeholder 
Experience 
Management 
Programme 
is initiated and 
Stakeholder 
Satisfaction Survey 
is conducted. 
 
Service provider procured 
for SEMP and phase 1 to 
conduct stakeholder 
satisfaction survey has 
been completed. Business 
process flow diagram in 
development. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
 
Sound financial accountability 
 
Improved budgetary 
control and contract 
and asset 
management. 
 
Training on budget control 
and 
management provided to 
line 
managers, asset count 
conducted 
and risk register developed 
and 
maintained. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation of operations and 
projects 
 
Internal capacity is 
built for holistic 
approach to M&E 
and data systems 
improved. 
 
New Seta Management 
System being 
implemented, nearing 
completion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 
Programme 2: 
Skills Planning 
 
Capacity for research and skills planning 
established 
 
Internal research 
capacity developed, 
regional skills plans 
developed and 
knowledge 
management 
strategy 
implemented. 
 
Labour market specialist, 
research administrator and 
knowledge management 
specialist recruited and 
engaged during the final 
year. 
 
Capacity building of stakeholders 
 
Regional skills 
development 
forums, provider 
forums, bargaining 
councils, chamber 
and other 
committees utilised 
to build skills 
development 
capacity of 
stakeholders. 
 
National roadshows 
conducted 
to communicate new SETA 
Grant 
Regulations. All other 
forums took 
place as planned, including 
chamber and regional 
committees. 
 
Grants aligned to the sector skills plan 
 
Support provided for 
scarce, critical and 
priority skills. 
 
Discretionary grant funding 
criteria were based on 
scarce, critical and priority 
skills needs within the MER 
sector. 
 
Implementation of partnerships for credible skills 
planning 
 
Research 
partnerships 
established and 
chair for 
manufacturing skills 
development 
established. 
 
Partnerships with local and 
international universities 
have been developed 
including institutions in 
Germany and the Czech 
Republic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 
Employed 
Bursaries 
Entered 
 
Number of employed learners 
who are recognised by 
merSETA as having been 
supported by a merSETA 
bursary to enter a qualifying 
programme in accordance 
with merSETA  processes 
and procedures for the period 
being considered 
116 
77. The target was not 
achieved (only 65% 
achieved) due to changes 
in the bursary reporting 
mechanism which meant 
that learners who are being 
funded for second and third 
years were 
no longer counted as 
entered. Change was 
introduced in September 
2012. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Programme 3: 
Increasing 
Access to 
Occupationally 
directed 
Programmes 
Employed 
Bursaries 
Completed 
 
Number of employed learners 
who are recognised by 
merSETA as having been 
supported by a merSETA 
bursary to complete a 
qualifying programme in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
61 
75. This target was 
achieved by 123% 
 
Over-achievement due to 
funding of more one-year 
courses than longer 
courses, including the 
learner tracking exercise of 
learners who commenced 
a 
number of years ago. 
Unemployed 
Learnerships 
Entered 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised  
by merSETA as having 
commenced a registered 
learnership in  accordance 
with merSETA  processes 
and procedures for the period 
being considered 
2021 
2690. This target was 
achieved by133% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being one of the 
Sector’s core functions and 
is well supported through 
discretionary and 
mandatory funding. 
Unemployed 
Learnerships 
Completed 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
successfully completed a 
registered learnership in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
1184 
2650. Target was achieved 
by 223% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being one of the 
Sector’s core functions and 
is well supported through 
discretionary 
and mandatory funding. 
Unemployed 
Skills 
Programmes 
Entered 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
commenced a registered 
skills programme in 
accordance to merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
806 
2461. Target was achieved 
by 305% 
 
Over-achieved due to two 
large 
Automotive Industry 
employers training 
unemployed learners to 
continue with production 
whilst employed learners 
undertook training. 
Unemployed 
Skills 
Programmes 
Completed 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
successfully completed a 
registered skills programme 
in accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
188 
1856. Target was achieved 
by 987% 
 
Over-achieved due to two 
large 
Automotive Industry 
employers training 
unemployed learners to 
continue with 
production whilst employed 
learners 
undertook training. 
Unemployed 
Bursaries 
Entered 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having been 
supported by a merSETA 
bursary to enter a qualifying 
programme in accordance 
with merSETA processes and 
procedures for the period 
being considered 
194 
220. Target was achieved 
by 113% 
 
Over-achievement due to a 
targeted 
recruitment and cost 
effective and 
inclusive bursary package 
being 
available to students. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Unemployed 
Bursaries 
Completed 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having been 
supported by a merSETA 
bursary to complete a 
qualifying programme in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
43 
94. Target was achieved by 
219% 
 
Over-achievement due to 
improved 
overall one-on-one support 
of bursary 
students. 
Internships 
entered 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having been 
supported by merSETA to 
enter a qualifying internship 
programme in accordance 
with merSETA processes and 
procedures for the period 
being considered 
180 
377. Target was achieved 
by 209% 
Over-achievement due to 
partnerships 
with institutions e.g. UJ and 
NMMU as 
well as EC Provincial 
Government in 
order to increase uptake of 
interns. 
Internships 
Completed 
 
Number of unemployed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having been 
supported by merSETA 
to complete a qualifying 
internship programme in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
63 
103. Target was achieved 
by 163% 
 
Over-achievement as 
internships run 
for a duration of 6 - 12 
months and 
some completions stem 
from previous 
year's entry. In addition, 
completion 
of internships is 
incentivised through 
discretionary grant funding. 
Employed 
Artisans Entered 
 
Number of employed 
apprentices who are 
recognised by merSETA 
as having commenced a 
registered apprenticeship 
in accordance to merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
1504 
 
1900. Target was achieved 
by 126%  
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions 
and is well supported 
through 
discretionary and 
mandatory funding. 
In addition it is further 
supported via a 
dedicated Accelerated 
Artisan Training 
Programme. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Employed 
Artisans 
Completed 
Number of employed 
apprentices who are 
recognised by merSETA as 
having successfully 
completed 
a registered apprenticeship 
in accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
563 
 
834. Target was achieved 
by 148% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions 
and is well supported 
through 
discretionary and 
mandatory funding. 
In addition it is further 
supported via a 
dedicated Accelerated 
Artisan Training 
Programme where close 
monitoring 
by regional offices also 
enables higher 
completion rates. 
Unemployed 
Artisans Entered 
Number of unemployed 
apprentices who are 
recognised by merSETA 
as having commenced a 
registered apprenticeship in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered. 
2204 
 
3549. Target was achieved 
by 161% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions 
and is well supported 
through 
discretionary and 
mandatory funding. 
In addition it is further 
supported via a 
dedicated Accelerated 
Artisan Training 
Programme. 
Unemployed 
Artisans 
Completed 
Number of unemployed 
apprentices who are 
recognised by merSETA as 
having successfully 
completed 
a registered apprenticeship 
in accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered. 
1390 
 
2115. Target was achieved 
by 152% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions 
and is well supported 
through 
discretionary and 
mandatory funding. 
In addition it is further 
supported via a 
dedicated Accelerated 
Artisan Training 
Programme where close 
monitoring 
by regional offices also 
enables higher 
completion rates. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Work 
Experience 
Number of learners 
recognised by merSETA as 
being supported to acquire 
their P1 or P2 experience in 
order to get their qualification 
555 
 
1108. Target was achieved 
by 200% 
 
The achievement has been 
a result 
of support through 
partnerships with 
institutions such as the 
University of 
Johannesburg, the Nelson 
Mandela 
Metropolitan University, the 
National 
Youth Development 
Agency and the 
Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government. 
Work Placement 
 
Number of learners who 
are recognised by merSETA 
as having found qualifying 
employment during or after 
completing a qualifying 
programme 
210 
352. Target was achieved 
by 168% 
 
Improved relationships with 
participating companies 
has supported 
the over-achievement of 
this target. 
4.4 
Programme 4: 
Promote the 
responsiveness 
of FETCs to 
sector need 
FET College 
Partnerships 
Number of FET colleges 
supported by merSETA 
6 
18. Target was achieved by 
300% 
 
merSETA has developed 
and 
implemented a clear and 
proactive 
FETC strategy, which is 
reliant upon 
linkages between colleges 
and industry. 
 
merSETA has prioritised 
and facilitated 
these linkages through 
regular 
industry-college forums, in 
order to 
ensure appropriate support 
to FETCs. 
4.5 
Programme 5: 
Address the 
low-level of 
youth and 
adult language 
and numeracy 
skills 
Employed Skills 
Programmes 
Entered 
 
Number of employed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
commenced a registered 
skills programme in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
3099 
4325. Target was achieved 
by 140% 
 
A number of companies 
are committed 
to uplifting their employees 
and the 
advocacy role played by 
merSETA has 
resulted in this 
achievement. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Employed Skills 
Programmes 
Completed 
 
Number of employed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
successfully completed a 
registered skills programme 
in accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
1448 
2177. Target was achieved 
by 150% 
 
A number of companies 
are committed 
to uplifting their employees 
and the 
advocacy role played by 
merSETA has 
resulted in this 
achievement. 
4.6 
Programme 6: 
Promote 
workplace 
skills 
development 
in the sector 
Employed 
Learnerships 
Entered 
 
Number of employed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
commenced a registered 
learnership in accordance 
to merSETA processes and 
procedures for the period 
being considered 
1732 
3336. Target was achieved 
by 193% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions and 
is well supported through 
discretionary 
and mandatory funding. 
Employed 
Learnerships 
Completed 
 
Number of employed 
learners who are recognised 
by merSETA as having 
successfully completed a 
registered learnership in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
940 
2109. Target was achieved 
by 224% 
 
Over-achievement is due to 
this being 
one of the Sector’s core 
functions and 
is well supported through 
discretionary 
and mandatory funding. 
Mandatory 
Grants Paid 
to Large 
Companies 
 
Number of large companies 
that have been paid out 
mandatory grants in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
400 
 
639. Target was achieved 
by 160% 
 
Extensive marketing was 
conducted 
through regional 
roadshows and 
support in the submission 
of WSPs and 
ATRs was provided 
through regional 
offices. 
Mandatory 
Grants Paid 
to Medium 
Companies 
 
Number of medium 
companies that have been 
paid out mandatory grants 
in accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
777 
 
1122. Target was achieved 
by 144% 
 
Extensive marketing was 
conducted 
through regional 
roadshows and 
support in the submission 
of WSPs and 
ATRs was provided 
through regional 
offices. 
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Programme 
Goal 
 
Performance 
Indicator 
 
Indicator Definition 
 
Target 2012/13 
 
Achievement 2012/13 and 
Variance 
Explanation 
 
Mandatory 
Grants Paid 
to Small 
Companies 
Number of small companies 
that have been paid out 
mandatory grants in  
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures for 
the period being considered 
1718 
 
2286. Target was achieved 
by 133% 
 
Extensive marketing was 
conducted 
through regional 
roadshows and 
support in the submission 
of WSPs and 
ATRs was provided 
through regional 
offices. 
4.7 
Programme 7: 
Cooperatives, 
small 
enterprises, 
NGOs and 
Community 
initiated 
training 
Cooperatives 
Number of cooperatives 
that have been supported by 
merSETA in any qualifying 
way according to merSETA 
processes and procedures 
2 
 
8.Target was achieved by 
400% 
 
 
Over-achievement due to a 
dedicated 
merSETA project aimed 
towards assisting 
cooperatives with meeting 
requirements for funding. 
Small Business 
Support 
Number of small companies 
that have been supported by 
merSETA in any qualifying 
way according to merSETA 
processes and procedures 
2087 
 
2740. Target was achieved 
by 131% 
 
Over-achievement as a 
result of 
ongoing support of small 
enterprises 
by merSETA Client Liaison 
Officers, 
who have provided 
guidance in skills 
planning and 
implementation. 
NGO, CBO, 
CBC 
 
Number of NGOs, CBOs 
and CBCs that have been 
supported by merSETA in 
any qualifying way according 
to merSETA processes and 
procedures 
9 
25. Target was achieved by 
278% 
 
Over-achievement as a 
result of a 
dedicated merSETA project 
aimed at 
supporting NGOs, CBOs 
and CBCs. 
4.8 
Programme 8: 
Career 
Development 
Career 
Guidance 
Number of recipients who 
have received qualifying 
career awareness support in 
accordance with merSETA 
processes and procedures 
1178 
 
2570. Target was achieved 
by 218% 
 
Over-achieved due to 
partnerships with 
various institutions 
including the SAGDA and 
NYDA. MerSETA has 
taken part in a large 
number of career 
exhibitions and conducted 
roadshows throughout the 
regions. 
 
Source:  merSETA Annual Report, 2012-13, p. 24:36 
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D. Interview guide  
 
Introduction: Interviewer to provide a short outline of nature and purpose of 
research project. 
 
Date:    ______________________________________ 
 
Name of Interviewee: ______________________________________ 
 
Organisation:  ______________________________________ 
 
Position:   ______________________________________ 
 
Structure/s participating in:    ____________________________________ 
 
Period of tenure:  ______________________________________ 
  
  
1. Can you comment on the perception of the performance of the SETAs, within the 
public domain? (Are these perceptions accurate in relation to the SETAs generally, 
and merSETA particularly?) 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Can you comment on the policy transfer of the SETAs from the DoL to the Dhet? 
(How has this affected how the merSETA operates)? 
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3. What are the key governance challenges that stakeholders are confronted with 
within the merSETA? 
 
 
 
  
3.1 What are the key responsibilities of stakeholders on merSETA fora? 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
 ________________________________________________________________ 
  
3.2 What are the competencies required of stakeholders on merSETA fora?  
(In your view, do all stakeholders have the necessary capacity to 
discharge their responsibilities). 
________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.3 Can you comment on the scale and scope of the mandate of the SETAs? 
Is it realistic?   
___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
4. What are the key institutional challenges that stakeholders are confronted with 
within the merSETA?   
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4.1 Can you comment on the decision-making processes within the merSETA 
fora such as the Board, Executive Committee (Exco), Chambers and Exco 
sub-committees? 
 
 
 
4.2 What are the rules and procedures which govern the merSETA with 
respect to Governance?  i.e.  compliance with the constitution, the SSP, 
the PFMA etc. 
 
 
 
4.3 What and how are the administrative processes managed within the 
merSETA?  More specifically with regard to operations:  i.e. the convening 
and notification of meetings;  provision of full information regarding 
procurement processes; participation in planning processes 
 
 
 
4.4 How would you describe stakeholder relations within the merSETA? 
 
 
 
4.5 Using the learnership / apprenticeship system as one of the key merSETA 
deliverables, can you comment on the impact being made by the 
merSETA? 
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5. If you were advising the merSETA on the afore-mentioned challenges, what would 
your advice be?  
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E. Coding frame 
 
Category Sub category Themes Sub Themes Code 
Governance (Gov) 
(and definitions) UNDP 
 Gov00 
  Re-establishment of SETAs  Gov00 1 
Socio-economic        
mandate (including BeD, Dti,  
etc)              
  Gov01 
Sector (Seta)            
mandate   
  Gov02 
Realistic  Gov02 1 
Un-realistic  Gov02 2 
Political                     
mandate (developmental) 
  Gov03 
Legacy (pre-1994)  Gov03 1 
Context / reality (post 94) = socio-
economic-political; sector i.e. 
education, manufacturing 
 Gov03 2 
Mission creep 
 
 Gov03 3 
Collaboration (synergy, integration) 
within Govt / Other SETAs, QTCO, 
HRD etc = + 
 
 Gov03 4 
Institutional 
arrangements (Ins) 
(sets of rules)AL 
 Ins00 
 g 
 
Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principals (too many masters) DHET, 
& includes AA 
 Ins01 
Composition 
  
 Ins02 
staff Ins02 1 
beneficiaries Ins02 2 
Interests 
 
 
 
 Ins03 
 
Conflict of interest 
(constituency & 
Ins03 1 
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 individual) 
Conflict :  i.e. 
Private training 
providers   
Ins03 2 
Conflict:  i.e.  Ins03 3 
 
Coherence / relationships  
 
 Ins04 
Good Ins04 1 
Bad Ins04 2 
Remuneration 
 
 Ins05 
Capacity, individual and orgs (hard (fin 
acumen) & soft, i.e. selfless, integrity)) 
 Ins06  
Roles and 
responsibilities 
 
Ins06 1 
Strategic l/ship 
(experts w sector) 
 
Ins06 2 
Structures   Ins07 
 
Culture (org & 
work) 
Ins07 1 
Complexity / 
architecture / 
restructuring 
Ins07 2 
Decision making (directive)  Ins08 
 
Prescriptive expenditure 
 
 Ins08 1 
Prescriptive targets 
 
 Ins08 2 
Surpluses  
 
 Ins08 3 
Capping expenditure  Ins08 4 
 
Transparency 
 
  Ins09 
Accountability 
 
  Ins10 
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Bureaucracy  
 
  Ins11 
Participation / consultation 
 
  Ins16 
Compliance / Legislation / 
fiduciary (Reporting) 
  Ins12 
Constitution 
 
 Ins12 1 
Board charter (delegation auth)  Ins12 2 
Terms of reference 
 
 Ins12 3 g 
PFMA  
 
 Ins12 4 
Treasury  
 
 Ins12 5 
AG (procurement oversight) audits 
(A.R.) 
 Ins12 6 
Fruitless & wasteful exp  Ins12 7 
 sanction Ins12 7 1 
Company secretary / governance unit  Ins12 8 
SSP (includes annual plans SLA)  Ins12 9 
 Research Ins12 9 1 
Perceptions   Ins13  
Negative:  SETAs  Ins13 1 
Negative:  merSETA  Ins13 2 
Positive:    merSETA  Ins13 3 
Performance … (impact) 
service delivery 
  Ins14  
Negative:  SETAs   Ins14 1 
Negative:  merSETA  Ins14 2 
Positive:    merSETA  Ins14 3 
Beneficiary training  Ins14 4 
Administration   Ins15 
Grants (mandatory & dg)  Ins15 1 
Grants, levy Y 1% (funding)  Ins15 2 
SMS  Ins15 3 
Communication / info   Ins15 4 
Public relations Ins15 4 1 
Customer surveys Ins15 4 2 
AGMs Ins15 4 3 
System & processes (including policies  Ins15 5 
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& procedures) 
No Comment 
 
 
 
 
  Ins17 
Q2 policy transfer  Ins17 1 
Q3 gov challenges  Ins17 2 
Q3.1 key responsibilities  Ins17 3 
Q3.2 key competencies  Ins17 4 
Q3.3 scale and scope  Ins17 5 
Q4 key institutional challenges  Ins17 6 
Q4.1 decision making  Ins17 7 
Q4.2 rules & procedures governance  Ins17 8 
Q4.3 admin processes managed  Ins17 9 
Q4.4 stakeholder relations  Ins17 10 
Q4.5 impact  Ins17 11 
Q 5 advice to MerSETA  Ins17 12 
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F. Schedule of Minutes and terms of references reviewed for this case study 
Audit Committee 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit Committee of merSETA and the external 
auditor held on Monday, 1 March 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit Committee of merSETA held on 17 May 
2010 at 14:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit Committee of merSETA held on 23 July 
2010 at 14:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 
11 October 2010 at 14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 16 May 
2011at 14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 25 July 
2011at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 24 
October 2011at 14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 30 
January 2012 at 12:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 12 March 
2012 at 14:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held 28 
May 2012 at 15:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held 16 
July 2012 at 14:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 8 
October 2012 at 14:00 
Minutes of the special meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 25 
January 2013 at 15:00 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Audit and Risk Committee of merSETA held on 
18 March 2013 at 15:00 
 g 
Executive Committee (Exco)  
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 20 April 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 17 August 2010 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 19 October 2010 at 
13:00 
Minutes of the extended meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 01 February 2011at 
14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 21 June 2011at 13:30 
Minutes of the meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 18 October 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 07 February 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Exco of merSETA held on 24 April 2012 at 08:30 
Minutes of the extended Exco meeting of merSETA held on 20 August 2012 at 14:00 
Minutes of the Exco meeting of merSETA held on 07 November 2012 at 09:00 
Minutes of the Exco meeting of merSETA held on 14 March 2013 at 09:00 
 
Innovation, Research and Development Committee (IRD) 
Minutes of the inaugural meeting of the IRD committee of the merSETA held on 28 
November 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the IRD committee of merSETA held on 21 February 2013 at 
09:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the IRD committee of merSETA held on 25 April 2013 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the IRD committee of merSETA held on 22 July 2013 at 10:00 
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Finance and Grants Committee of merSETA (FG) 
Minutes of the meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 03 August 2011at 
09:30 
Minutes of the meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 01 November 2011at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 21 February 2012 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the special meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 20 March 
2012 at 08:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 08 May 2012 
at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 31 July 2012 
at 08:30 
Minutes of the special meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 10 September 
2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 19 November 2012 at 
14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the FG committee of merSETA held on 11 March 2013 at 
09:00 
 
Governing Board (GB) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Governing Board assessment and training of 
merSETA held on 21 April 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 25 May 
2010 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 27 July 
2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 17 
September 2010 at 10:00 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 25 
November 2010 at 11:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 24 March 2011 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 23 May 2011 at 
14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 26 July 2011 at 
14:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 16 August 2011 at 
11:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 20 September 
2011 at 11:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 22 November 2011 
at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 27 March 2012 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 29 May 2012 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 24 July 2012 at 
10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 25 September 
2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the meeting of the Governing Board of merSETA held on 27 November 2012 
at 10:00 
 
Auto Chamber (AC) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
25 February 2010 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
03 June 2010 at 08:00 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
09 September 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
28 September 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
23 November 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
30 November 2011 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
01 March 2012 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
29 June 2012 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
30 November 2012 at 09:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Auto Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 1 
March 2013 at 09:00 
 
Metal Chamber (MetC) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
03 February 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
05 May 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
11 August 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
31 August 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
02 November 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
01 February 2012 at 10:00 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
30 May 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
31 October 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Metal Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
05 February 2013 at 10:00 
 
Motor Chamber (MC) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
10 February 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
26 May 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
18 August 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
10 November 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
08 February 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
07 September 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
23 November 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
08 February 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
15 June 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
05 September 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
15 November 2012 at 10:00 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Motor Chamber committee of merSETA, held on 
12 February 2013 at 10:00 
 
Plastics Chamber (PC) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 17 February 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 25 August 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 17 November 2010 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 14 September 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 16 November 2011 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 15 February 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 13 June 2012 at 10:00 
Draft minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, 
held on 12 September 2012 at 10:00 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the Plastics Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 14 November 2012 at 10:00 
 
New Tyre Chamber (NTC) 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 21 May 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 03 September 2010 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 19 November 2010 at 08:30 
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Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 25 February 2011 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 21 September 2011 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 06 December 2011 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 24 February 2012 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 22 June 2012 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 19 September 2012 at 08:30 
Minutes of the ordinary meeting of the New Tyre Chamber committee of merSETA, held 
on 22 February 2013 at 09:00 
 
Terms of Reference 
 
Audit and Risk Committee Charter 
Executive Committee 
Finance and Grants Committee 
Governing Board Charter 
Innovation, Research and Development (IRD) Committee 
Remuneration and Human Resources Committee 
Service Level Agreement, DHET and MerSETA 2012 / 2013 
Service Level Agreement, DHET and MerSETA 2014/2015 
Strategic Plan 2013 / 2014 
Strategic Plan 2013/14 – 2017/18 
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G. Management Information Strategy (MIS) decision making 
 
This agenda item was considered by the Exco at their meeting of the 20 April 2010, 
where “the office was requested to effect amendments for presentation to the next 
meeting of the Accounting Authority” (merSETA min, 2010e).  The meeting of the 
Accounting Authority held on 25 May 2010 considered the item Risk Matrix top 20 risks 
where it was noted that the risks 1 and 6 relating to the Management Information 
System (MIS) and Information Technology should be considered as red pending the 
successful implementation of the new MIS system (merSETA min, 2010c).  At the said 
meeting under item A.0261, the MIS is referred back to the Exco to address certain 
recommendations and for submission to the next meeting of the Accounting Authority 
(merSETA min, 2010c).  The meeting of the Accounting Authority held on the27 July 
2010 commends management for the management on the progress made with the Risk 
Matrix without specific reference to the MIS (merSETA min 2010a).  The Accounting 
Authority at their meeting held on the 17 September 2010, notes that substantial work in 
respect of a user needs analysis is required and approves the strategy with the proviso 
that the gaps identified at the Accounting Authority meeting of the 25 May 2010 be 
incorporated (merSETA min, 2010d).  The agenda item Information Technology strategy 
was not discussed at the Accounting Authority meeting held on the 24 March 2011.  The 
Accounting Authority raises concern about the “IT” strategy not having been finalised in 
light of it being flagged as a high risk area at their meeting of the 25 November 2011 
and that the office should ensure that it be tabled at the next meeting of the Accounting 
Authority.  The meeting of the Accounting Authority held on the 26 July 2011 notes that 
a new MIS system has been introduced and that WSPs (Workplace Skills Programmes) 
can be submitted (merSETA min, 2011d).  The summary of the 20 top risks are noted at 
the Accounting Authority meeting of the 22 November 2011 (merSETA min, 2011i).  The 
Exco at their meeting held on the 07 February 2012 considers the proposal from the 
DHET with regard to an integrated IT system for all SETAs, noting that there are 
approximately 14 different IT systems in operation within the 21 SETAs (merSETA min, 
2012k).  The DHETs request to implement the integrated IT system is approved with a 
submission to be made to the Accounting Authority for ratification due to time 
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constraints (merSETA min, 2012k). The Exco held on the 24 April 2012 notes that, “The 
proposal regarding development and implementation of an integrated IT system for all 
SETAs has been communicated again as the DHET lost the initial proposal” (merSETA 
min, 2012i). The meeting of the Accounting Authority held on the 29 May 2012 ratified 
the request for support from the DHET to develop and implement the integrated IT 
system for all SETAs in terms of the delegation of authority framework (merSETA min, 
2012f).  The Accounting Authority at its meeting held on the 24 July 2012 raised the 
concern that Information Communication and Technology (ICT) is a specialised area but 
that the plan does not contain sufficient detail. Furthermore, that “the plan is not linked 
to funding and that the structure does not recognise the proposal that staff must be 
supported with technical assistance.  The meeting proposed that expert opinion be 
obtained in this regard” (merSETA min, 2012l).  It was resolved that the ICT Strategic 
Plan be adopted in the interim but that it be referred to the Audit and Risk Committee for 
consideration (merSETA min, 2012l).  The Accounting Authority at their meeting held on 
the 27 November 2012 discussed Risk Assessment.  The meeting noted that the top 20 
risks were mostly compliance related type risks.  It was decided that in future risks will 
be tracked in the QMR (Quarterly Management Reporting) meeting, and that “instead of 
showing only the top 20 risks from time to time, the overall risk management activity and 
the movement of the risks also be reflected regularly” (merSETA min, 2012h). 
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H. 3 sub-frameworks that comprise the NQF 
 
 NQF 
Level 
Qualification Types   
Higher Education 
Qualifications 
Sub framework 
under the 
CHE 
10 Doctoral degree / 
professional 
- 
Occupational 
Qualifications 
Sub-framework 
under the QCTO 
9 Doctoral degree / 
professional 
- 
8 Bachelor of 
Honours degree / 
Postgraduate 
Diploma / 
Bachelor’s degree 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 8 
7 Bachelor’s degree / 
Advanced 
Diploma 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 7 
6 Diploma / 
Advanced 
Certificate 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 6 
5 Higher Certificate Occupational 
Certificate 
level 5 
General and 
Further 
Education and 
Training Sub 
framework 
under 
Umalusi 
4 National Certificate 
/ Grade 12 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 4 
3 Intermediate 
Certificate / Grade 
11 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 3 
2 Elementary 
Certificate / Grade 
10 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 2 
1 General Certificate 
/ Grade 9 
Occupational 
Certificate 
level 1 
 
 
Source:  DHET NSDSII Progress Report 2011 – 2013 pg. 8 
 
